

FRIEDRICH HEINRICH JACOBI

A STUDY IN THE ORIGIN OF
GERMAN REALISM

BY

NORMAN WILDE, A. M.

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
IN THE
UNIVERSITY FACULTY OF PHILOSOPHY
COLUMBIA COLLEGE

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INTRODUCTION

FOR the general history of culture, the appearance of a realistic philosophy in Germany during the last quarter of the 18th century is a fact hardly less significant than the contemporaneous rise of the critical spirit. For the general history of culture, not for the history of the pure speculative development. In intellectual power, Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi can bear no comparison with Immanuel Kant. The genius of the two men was of an essentially different type. To one fresh from the study of the weighty sentences of the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, the luxuriant rhetoric and tiresome repetitions of *Allwill's Briefsammlung* will appear mere substitutes for lack of real content. Precision, system, is not to be sought in Jacobi's writings. He seizes his point with an intuition almost feminine, and enforces it with the enthusiasm of a preacher nature. Philosophy *aus einem Stück* is not his ideal. His only method is to present a series of unconnected ideas in the form most favorable for their reception. In his earliest work, *Allwill*, we have the idea of the individual as his own ethical law. Yet it is not a treatise on morals, but a romance which leaves us with a problem rather than a solution. In his

David Hume, we have the idea of Realism as the basis of a theory of knowledge, yet it is neither completed nor clearly analyzed, only presented. In *Von den göttlichen Dingen* we have his philosophy of religion and revelation—but it is rather an outburst of enthusiasm than a reasoned treatise. In short, all his writings are but the expression of his own life—the concrete presentation of philosophy as taken up into his own personality.

To criticise his work as a *system* therefore, and assign it a place in the history of philosophy, would be to judge it by an external standard, and wholly misrepresent its meaning. But to deny his power as a logical thinker, is by no means to deny the importance of his position in the general history of culture. One might almost say that a man like Jacobi is more the *object* of philosophy than its thinker. His task is the analysis and rendering evident of those inner currents of life which it is the task of the systematic thinker to combine. Hence philosophy can nowhere find a more fruitful field of study than the life of a man who has taken up into himself the ground tendencies of his age, and presents them as moulded into the concrete unity of his personality. The very lack of logical consistency in the result, while the ground for exclusion from the succession of philosophical thinkers, is of value as material, since it serves to call attention from the form, and concentrate it on the idea which is thus imperfectly striving for expression. Such a man's life is like a magnet drawing from the most varied matters that which is related to itself. And since, in its last analysis, it is man's relation to the universe which is the problem of philosophy, it is this principle of individual appropriation which it is its task to study. Whether the form of the principles assimilated be correct or not, the mere fact that they are so combined calls for investigation and guarantees the presence of a content of practical truth. Moreover, while

it is possible to consider every thinker under this aspect and criticise him in his relation to the environment, it is more profitable to consider in this way those characters which are peculiarly the products of their time, those natures which give back more directly the reflection of reality, instead of analyzing that reality and presenting it to us in reasoned form. It is the poet and prophet natures we would thus study, the power of whose personality lies in the fact that they receive their inspiration from the unconscious forces of their age. Such a man was Jacobi, and it is as a result, and not as a cause, that we have to study him.

Yet though we are to consider him rather in this passive aspect—as the recipient of earlier thought, and not as its organizer and developer—we have not to do with a mere collection of ideas fortuitously combined in one individual. He is not merely the meeting point of the various lines of thought, but combines them on one principle and directs them to one end. Standing on the dividing line between the first and second periods of modern philosophy, he holds up the results of the past in one hand, and the problems of the future in the other, calling on the modern thinkers to unite the two. For his part, he gives up the task. For him, Spinoza had said the last word of speculative philosophy, and every logical system must reduce to his. But, on the other hand, he holds fast to the ideas which to him seem alone to give value to life and speculation. God, freedom and immortality, are *facts*, and any system which denies their reality is self-destructive, and fails to meet the given problems. This is the test which he applies to the new systems that followed rapidly on the critical philosophy. Do they meet the demands of the human spirit? If not, they are worthless for Jacobi, however logical they may be. And his criticism is keen. His lack of system in his own thought does not arise from a weakness, but is the result of

conviction. "Every method of demonstration leads to Atheism," is his principle, and, urged by this idea, he is the straightener of his opponents' systems. He was no logical weakling who discerned the inconsistency in Kant's position, and prophesied its idealistic development before Fichte began to write. Nor does he fail to recognize the power and consistency of the Subjective Idealism. If we are to have a real philosophy, it must be along the lines which Fichte has laid down.¹ Reason will never be satisfied until it has explained all things from its own principle. Against such a system it is neither in Jacobi's purpose nor power to strive. If it can satisfy any one, he is free to adopt it. Spinozism and Subjective Idealism, which are but the one cube standing on different faces, are true models of what a scientific philosophy must be. It is the aim of Jacobi to make this issue, with all it involves, clearly seen.

But if one is not satisfied with this subjective system of concepts, and demands something more than clearness and logical necessity, then he must leave philosophy and take refuge in *Glauben*, which alone gives access to the real. If the *truth* is not an abstraction from the *true*, it is no more than a play with terms. The ultimate standard of truth and falsehood lies outside the concept in the real, which is forever beyond the reach of discursive thought. This is the idea for which Jacobi stands, and which he upholds against every opponent during that fertile quarter of a century following the *Kritik*. As opposed to philosophy it assumes the name of Faith. As an attempt to reach the real which is the ground of truth, it is known as Realism. Our task will be first the consideration of the causes of such a tendency, and then the exposition of its meaning.

¹ Jacobi's *Werke*, III., 19. The edition quoted is that prepared by himself in six volumes. (Leipzig, 1812-1825.) While the fourth volume was in press, Jacobi died, and the remaining volumes were issued under the supervision of his friends Roth and Köppen.

PART I

FORMATIVE INFLUENCES

1. Pietism

FROM the latter quarter of the 17th century there had been gradually growing a new power in the religious life of Germany. Not that it was a wholly new idea which thus rose into prominence, but that this idea received new emphasis, and was realized in the practical life of the individual and the government of the church, in a way never before known. To a greater or less extent, the mystical side of religious life has always exercised peculiar attractions for certain natures, but it was first in Pietism that it was objectified and made the rule of church life and doctrine.

To trace the origin of this mode of thought, would carry us back through the whole history of philosophy and lead us to the earliest attempts at defining the relation of man to God, for this element has always been present as the peculiarly religious side of philosophy and in unconcealed opposition to its intellectual side. Not to speak of the Oriental systems, we find this practical reaction of the feelings against the intellect whenever the latter has exceeded its authority, or attained a preponderating influence in life. Not that the reaction always takes the form of what is properly known as Mysticism, for the form which it assumes is dependent on the condition of the social and political life in which it is manifested. The reaction from the early

Greek rationalism, represented by the Sophists, found its field in practical political action, and had no tendency to turn inward on itself in mystic contemplation. Similar in its character was the post-Aristotelian practical philosophy. Although the Macedonian and Roman conquests had deprived Greece of any free political life in which the genius of its thinkers could find expression, still the healthy, objective character of the Greek nature refused to be forced inward, and found vent for its thought in the ethical culture of the individual.

It was otherwise at Alexandria. There the true mysticism came to its free completion, and showed the real nature of its opposition to reflective thought. It is essentially the revolt against a mediated knowledge, and an attempt to reach the ultimate reality by immediate contact with it. Skeptical as regards the power of the reason to *know* the Absolute, it takes refuge from a complete skepticism in the faith in its power to *be* the Absolute—in the attempt to pass beyond all knowledge about the truth, and come into immediate contact with the true.

We see in this phase of thought that sharp dualism which is the foundation of all Mysticism—a dualism which, however sharply defined, must be overcome in order to satisfy the religious instincts of man. Hence the more earnestly the opposition is maintained, the bolder must be the theory which can overcome it, and the more mystical its expression. Mysticism is the despair of knowledge, and as Zeller shows,¹ that of the Alexandrian schools was largely the result of the skepticism of Ænesidemus and his followers. Natural knowledge was discredited, and a higher power of direct intuition was claimed. Even this was not enough. The soul must rise above this direct intuition and lose itself in its union with God. The attraction there is in this idea of a knowl-

¹ *Grundriss der Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie*, S. 265.

edge above knowledge—of a communion with God which is free from the limits of the reflective understanding—is evident from the frequency with which it reappears in later thought. Christianity was a direct stimulus to this mood, which was an attempt to bring to expression the inner meaning of this new religion. Individuality and spirituality were the characteristics of Christianity, however far from this ideal the doctrinal and institutional development was carried. The soul is regarded as standing immediately in relation to its Maker, and the image is conceived almost spatially, as if it were but necessary to turn the inner eye upon its object in order to come directly into relation with God. The earlier dualism of nature is transformed into one of will, and its resolution is but an act of will by which the soul is brought into harmony with God.

This current of thought is no unimportant one during the Middle Ages, though it was rather a religious mood than a definite doctrine. As Harnack says,¹ it was the true religion of the church during that whole period, and the material from which doctrinal Christianity was shaped. According to Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, the true knowledge of God as he is, leads to the blending of the soul with its object.² So on the contrary side, Duns Scotus reaches the same result by his doctrine of the denial of the individual will. It is thus not in the nature of the results to be attained in the religious life, but in the means to be employed, that the doctrinal differences of the church and the later Mysticism outside its bounds, arose. And it was on this point that Luther broke from the Roman communion through his doctrine of justification by faith. Instead of the attempt to reach this condition of union with God through the denial

¹ *Dogmengeschichte*, III., 374.

² Ritschl, *Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung*, I., 122.

of the world, or through mystic contemplation, he emphasized the theory of its attainment through faith in Christ. It is not a different end of life which Luther sets before him, but the means for its attainment are different from those of the earlier church. In his preface to the *Deutsche Theologie*, he expresses his great indebtedness to this work, ranking it next to the Bible and Augustine's writings, and the spirit of this book is that of Tauler's mysticism.

This emphasis necessarily placed on the new *theory* of religious life produced that dead dogmatism of the two following centuries. The real content of religion was lost sight of in the attempt to determine the form in which it was to be expressed. During the religious wars which divided Germany for so many years, the mass of the people lost all interest in the real questions at issue, regarding confessions as watchwords for party strife. In such a condition of religious stagnation, two courses were open to the more earnest minds. Speculative thinkers turned from this profitless war of words and looked for a more satisfying theory of life in the systems of foreign philosophy. French and English influences were early taken up and developed. Not without the opposition of the church, however, for in 1653 we find the University of Marburg commanding its professors neither "to approve themselves, nor teach their scholars that philosophy bearing the name of Descartes, which demands a universal doubt."¹ But the spread of the new philosophy was swift and sure, not only in theology but also in science. A new spirit of inquiry is noticeable in all departments of thought. The call to Heidelberg which Spinoza received in 1673 from the Elector Palatine, is a significant sign of increasing freedom and enlarging interests.

On the other hand, the more religious spirits betook themselves again to mysticism as a refuge from the barren-

¹ Hettner, *Litteraturgeschichte des 18ten Jahrhundert*, III., 1, S. 36.

ness of current theology. Weigel, Arndt, Gerhardt and Böhme are types of this tendency. It was the spreading of this inner piety within the church, that was the task of Spener. He recognized the fact that he was introducing no new idea, but only bringing again into prominence the true conception of Christianity. But his reforms were bitterly opposed by the dominant theologians, however eagerly they were taken up by the mass of the people, and it was only after a hard struggle that his views attained authoritative recognition. But in this effort he was aided by the new rationalism. However strange such a union may appear in the light of their later development, it is quite natural when we consider their origin from a common principle. It is the same idea of individualism and subjectivity which was at the root of Christianity and all its later developments. The new Cartesian rationalism was decidedly individualistic, and demanded freedom from all prejudice or authority. The universal doubt was its foundation. But this universal doubt was but to bring out the individual certainty, and change the seat of authority from the external to the internal standard. This also was the tendency of Pietism. It drew attention from the external forms of religion back to the internal ground of them. No matter how true may be the doctrines which one accepts, it is only as they are subjectively realized and lived that they become of value for the individual. What is not thus involved in consciousness, is of no personal value, whether it be true or false. Out of one's own experience must one be able to develop the distinctively Christian doctrines. Belief can rest on no other basis than this voluntary appropriation of truth. So, Spener: "Nicht Verstand, sondern Wille, ist die Quelle des Glaubens."¹ But this individuality and subjectivity of faith, is by no means intended to prejudice the universality and ob-

¹ Quoted by J. Schmidt, *Geschichte des geistigen Lebens*, I., 81.

jectivity of its contents. It is only the personal nature of the appropriation which it is desired to emphasize, and not the nature of the object. The soul, by this act of will, comes into immediate contact with reality. If it were not so they would have no explanation of the actual effects of this faith. Not that Pietism set itself the task of justifying its belief through an analysis of the act of faith itself, for it was not a reflective system. It was individualistic, but not rationally so. The common doctrines of the church were accepted in their general import, and it was only in the practical application of them that reform was demanded.

It was not as unorthodox that Spener and his followers were mainly assailed, but as disturbers of the organization of the church, and enthusiasts. What doctrinal attacks were made on them were easily refuted. The union with rationalism was only on the basis of their common hostility to external authority, and as soon as the individual obtained his recognition the league was broken. By the aid of Christian Thomasius, Pietism obtained a firm footing in Halle, and rapidly spread through the church; but in proportion as it gained power and hardened into rigid rules of belief and practice, this rationalistic common-sense support fell away from it and turned against its former ally. And Pietism was not long in reaching this point when it became no longer the representative of individual freedom, but the dogmatic assertor of a special doctrine. Even in Spener's lifetime, the movement passed beyond his control, and instead of being the spontaneous action flowing from inner conviction, the *Busskampf*, or conversion, which was the distinctive mark of the new sect, had become a set formula to which every man's inner experience must conform. In this idea of conversion, we see the old dualism coming again to prominence as in earlier mysticism. God and the world, or God and the soul, are sharply divided from one another,

and it needs a supernatural interference to bring them once more into union. The evidence of this reunion is the *Busskampf*, which represents the struggle through which the soul passes under the influence of divine mercy. It is the new birth, in which the old man is put off, and the new man is born into a miraculous life of peace and righteousness. The distinctive character of this process is its non-naturalness. It is only by a complete change of nature that salvation is attained. There is no community between the old and the new, no passage from the natural to the spiritual. This process then, which in the awakening from the prevailing formalism was probably the common experience of the reformers, was afterwards regarded as necessary for all who would be regarded as wholly awakened. And undoubtedly this inner expression was a tremendous power in bringing men to a realization of the actual meaning of religion. No one who had gone through this struggle with himself could doubt of the reality of his conversion, however he might interpret its meaning. Men were thus brought face to face with reality in their own souls, and made to feel a power not their own. They were carried out of their common life and found a new one in themselves, which had more reality than the one without. So the attention was drawn within, and all interest centered in watching the development of this new growth. It became the custom for pastors to keep a record of the spiritual experiences of their flocks, and watch the ebb and flow of emotions. Individuals also kept such records and compared this growth from week to week. It was in such a manner that the way was prepared for that later development of *schöne Seelen*, which is one of the most extraordinary phenomena in the history of culture, and it was in such an atmosphere that Jacobi's childhood was passed.

The details of his early life are little known, but he him-

self gives a few hints of the early influences which helped to form his character.¹ His birth occurred 1743, during the early years of the second Pietistic movement, when Zinzendorf was organizing the *Herrnhüter* and giving new life to the whole party. His mother dying soon after his birth, he was left to the care of a pious maid-servant, who early instructed him in the observances of her peculiar religious life. Under such influences, he soon joined himself to a religious society known as *die Feinen*, a sect of Pietism originally from Holland. At that time, however, Pietism had hardened into a rigid system which could have little attraction for one who was bent on finding intelligent satisfaction for his deepest needs. The great facts for which it stood had not been without effect on a sensitive nature like Jacobi's, but he was also a thinker and could not be satisfied without examining the foundation of his faith. It is in the process of this examination that he comes in contact with the second of the main influences in his life. We have no direct account of his first essays in philosophy, but there can be no doubt that he early made acquaintance with the prevailing schools of his time.

2. Rationalism

The term Rationalism may serve to designate the general type of philosophy in Germany at the middle of that century, but we must bear in mind that it was not the pure

¹ The chief sources for our knowledge of Jacobi's life are his own statements in *David Hume* (*Werke*, II., 178-193), and his correspondence, edited by his friend and disciple Roth, in two volumes, Leipzig, 1825. The letters do not begin before his Geneva life, nor does he mention his childhood save by giving an anecdote from it—IV¹, 67. Interesting, though containing little original, is F. Deycks, *Fr. Hr. Jacobi im Verhältniss zu seinen Zeitgenossen*, Frankfurt, 1848. Also E. Zirngiebel, *F. H. Jacobi's Leben, Dichten und Denken*, Wien, 1867. Of minor interest may be mentioned, R. Zöpplitz, *Aus F. H. Jacobi's Nachlass*, and *Briefwechsel zwischen Göthe und Jacobi*, herausg. von Max Jacobi, Leipzig, 1846.

system of earlier times. We are apt to think of the dogmatism of Wolff as the main system in Germany previous to the appearance of the *Kritik*, but such was by no means the case. The prevailing mode at that time was that mixture of Leibnitzian theology and common-sense psychology, which united in the most varied forms of eclecticism. It is little wonder that a mind seeking an explanation of the mystic view of life should find no satisfaction in such a system as this. Yet there was an element in it which would appeal to his needs, and which probably led him to continue his studies in Geneva. This was its empiricism.

Although the popular philosophy was founded on the rationalism of Leibnitz and Wolff, its real force as a popular system was due to its union with French and English sensationalism. It was this element of realism which gave it its power with common-sense thinkers. The stiffness of the school-philosophy of Wolff could not stand before the growing influence of empirical psychology as introduced from France and England. In Wolff's own system we find this element even in his professedly rational concepts. Experience refuses to be banished to a separate department reserved for it alone, but invades the territory of its more distinguished rival. Of this influence, Wolff does not seem aware, but in the further development of his thought, the new scientific movement of the 18th century could not fail to leave its trace. The apparent occasion was this foreign influence, but the real ground for it was already prepared on native soil as is shown by the realistic movement in German literature. It is the same spirit we have seen in Pietism. The inner life of the people was striving for literary expression, and would not be satisfied with that which was foreign to this life, whether it was presented as translation from the French or as native romance of an earlier age. The improvement in literary form which followed the increased

intellectual activity in Germany, was not enough. The attempt of the *Aufklärung* to write poetry by rule, was destined to a speedy failure. The real content was lacking—it failed to express the rude beginnings of national life. The classic form of French literature, which formed their model, was inherent in the French life and best expressed its genius, but when transferred to a foreign soil it could only serve to cramp and confine all literary effort. The attempt to rationalize literature was followed by a reaction of the natural *Volksleben*, crude at first, but soon reaching its true expression in Lessing and Herder. We have no longer an artificial construction according to rational rules, but the presentation of reality itself in the form most natural to it.

And this same tendency it is which forms the moving power in the Wolffian transformation of rationalism into a philosophy of common sense. Men were coming slowly to self consciousness, and turning from the abstractions of speculation to the realities of the individual life. Confident in its reason as the *Aufklärung* was, this confidence was placed, not in the reason as a special organ of truth, but rather in the general power of the whole individual as independent of external authority or belief. It was rather reason *vs.* authority, than reason *vs.* sense. Almost unconsciously the popular philosophy had taken up into itself elements from all departments of life, and to this combination had given the confidence which had formerly been bestowed by philosophy on reason alone. Experience had crept in, but its relation to reason had not been clearly defined. Eclecticism had come into vogue, and each man took what he needed, with little care as to how it should be combined with his general principle—if he had any. It is probably one of these systems which was Jacobi's introduction to philosophy, though we have no mention of it. At any rate, busied as he was with problems of life and thought, he was useless in

his father's business, and was allowed to go to Geneva in 1760.

3. Sensationalism

The system which he learned to know in the writings of the French Empiricists, was no such mixed doctrine as he had found at home. The simplicity and reality of such a method must have appealed strongly to a youth of Jacobi's nature. The subject matter was life, not thought. No time was spent in elaborating the concept, but the object of the search was fact.

And here we come across an interesting piece of autobiography which shows Jacobi's method of thought at this period and later. Before leaving home, he had been most diffident in regard to his powers of thought, since his masters had always pronounced him slow in comprehending philosophic teaching. It had always been necessary for him to reduce all propositions to their simplest intuitive forms. Whatever he could not thus reduce, was incomprehensible to him. It is plain that the prevailing rationalistic or eclectic systems could not stand this test, and Jacobi was in despair of his powers.

On coming to Geneva, however, he made the acquaintance of Le Sage, to whom he explained his troubles, and with whom he began his studies anew. By the works which he recommended for his reading, we see that Le Sage must have continued his instruction in the same eclectic systems. Jacobi himself expressed a wish to read S'Gravesande's *Introductio ad philosophiam*—a work conceived in the spirit of the Newtonian physics—so that we may conjecture that the basis of study was empirical. Among other works suited to counteract the prevailing skeptical tendencies, we find the *Logic* of M. de Crousaz recommended. But these do not seem to have satisfied Jacobi, for we find his teacher lamenting over his praises of a work on necessity and liberty—an

anonymous book, which Le Sage thinks must be the *Essai de Psychologie*. This was probably the case, for later in life Jacobi professed to know Bonnet's writings almost by heart. Rousseau's writings are painted in colors almost as glowing as Rousseau's own, says Le Sage again. We see then that Jacobi had passed out of his earlier eclecticism, to take up elements more congenial to the real spirit of his life.

For in his feelings he was akin to Rousseau, and the scientific method corresponding to such a nature is the one of direct observation and intuition. In all his later writings we find the traces of Rousseau's influence, though appearing in a more moderate and legitimate form.

The personal characters of the two men were quite different, and Jacobi never felt anything but aversion for the Confessions, which he rightly saw were the product of disease, so that the ethics of *Woldemar* and *Allwill* represent exactly the relation which Jacobi bore to the morality of the heart. These two works are only problems representing the struggle between the lawlessness of the heart and the barrenness of the head. Individuality is the key-note of Jacobi's position, and his whole philosophy is merely the preaching of his own personal views—he could never discover the means of introducing law into ethics without destroying all spontaneity. The individualism of his age was too strong for him. He had broken from the externality of the old rationalism by means of his pietistic training, which also carried him over to the standpoint of the *Gefühlsphilosophie*, but he never was able to pass beyond this position, and all his life combated Kant with a theory as abstract in its way as the formalism of the categorical imperative.

This emphasis on the primacy of feeling did not confine Jacobi within the narrow limits which are wont to restrict the thinkers of the like tendency. He was neither a pure mystic nor a reason-hater, however much authority for call-

ing him so his mere words may seem to give. He has no such hatred of science as is often ascribed to him—for instance by Zirngiebel.¹ During his Geneva life, as already mentioned, he made himself well acquainted with the French scientific spirit, represented by that distinguished group of encyclopedists gathered there, but it is not this scientific method which he has in mind when he utters his frequent tirades against *Wissenschaft*. It is not of empirical science as such that he is speaking when he says "it is the interest of science that there be no God."² It is in his later writings that we find the greater number of these passages, when Fichte's use of the term *Wissenschaft* had roused his opposition. With the strictly scientific men of his age, he had no quarrel as to method. The French sensualists and materialists he heartily opposes, but it is not on grounds of method, but of results. He accepts the experiential basis of knowledge, and his claim for recognition lies in a closer analysis and more complete induction of facts. His dialogue of *David Hume* is in parts almost as empirical as the works of that author.

It is only in his ethical and religious writings that he expressly attacks the empiricists, and even in this it is often hard to decide whether he is speaking in his own character or only maintaining the dialogue, for his sympathies are generally with both parties. He is certainly not at one with Rousseau in his hatred of modern civilization and science, as a clear passage in *Woldemar* expressly states.³ It was not his stay in Geneva which determined the opposition between *Glauben* and *Wissen* for Jacobi, but his earlier religious training and his later study of Spinoza. It is speculative, rational *Wissenschaft* which he attacks, and not a careful induction

¹ *F. H. Jacobi's Leben, Dichten und Denken*, p. 7.

² *Werke*, III., 384, 385.

³ V., 206.

of facts and classification of laws. In several passages in the general introduction to his philosophical writings, he is careful to use limiting clauses in his sweeping denunciation of science. Against science "within its own limits" he has nothing to say; it is only when it passes out of the natural and dogmatizes in regard to the supernatural, that its validity can be questioned.¹ In the preface to the fourth volume of his works written just before his death, he describes this *Wissenschaft* in terms which make it very clear what school or type of philosophy he is opposing: "Science will love and respect only itself, recognize nothing above itself, but be, and bring forth, all in all—it will be as God. It lays claim to omniscience, asserts its power to destroy all doubt, to possess all truth; is proclaimed from professors' chairs as the all-sufficient teaching and wisdom, compared with which the thinkers of all ages have reasoned falsely and been ensnared in error and delusion. This science, the so-called real and only one, consists in the self-production of its own object. It creates the true and the truth; is wholly independent and changes all else into nothingness."² This volume contains his main work on Spinoza, and hence this preface is directed against that type of philosophy, and not the properly scientific writers of his time. Jacobi is always partial to the scientific nations, the English and French. Especially early in life, in his romances he quotes largely from the Scotch and English moralists, and he was one of the first to introduce Adam Smith's economic theories to Germany. His *Politische Rhapsodie* is confessedly only an exposition of the principles contained in the *Wealth of Nations*.

Science then, for Jacobi, means demonstrated knowledge of the Absolute. Its representatives are not the French Naturalists whom he has met during this Geneva period of

¹ II, 116.

² IV., XXIX. Also III., 20.

his life, but Materialists and Idealists so far as they attempt a complete system of the universe. Spinoza and Fichte are ever in his mind when he inveighs against knowledge. His quarrel with sensationalism is not on grounds of method, but of result. It is not as false, but as partial, that he is forced to reject its conclusions. His own method is identical with that of science, and his cry is, "Oh that the torch of science might come again into the hands of experience, that with it the ancient march toward reason and truth might begin anew."¹

4. *Spinozism*

It is shortly after his return to Germany, that Jacobi comes in contact with the last influence which had a determining effect on his thought. The subject of the Berlin Academy for its prize essay in 1763, had been on the Evidence in Metaphysical Knowledge, and Jacobi had looked forward to the crowned essay with great interest, as the subject had much engaged his attention at the time. Mendelssohn's essay, however, was a disappointment to him—he had expected some new light on the subject, but instead found only a graceful recapitulation of the old arguments for the existence of God. These had already been rejected by Jacobi as worthless, and his thorough study of the empiricists had only strengthened his partiality for a more realistic method than that of the common-sense thinkers. But the confidence with which Mendelssohn brought forward the old arguments roused him to a new study of them, in order to discover what was the reason of their continued power with so many minds. Descartes' position he already knew, and having read Leibnitz' remark that Spinozism was only a completed Cartesianism,² he began the study of the *Ethics*. This, as he says, was the decisive period for his later de-

¹ II., 267.

² *Théodicée*, § 393.

velopment. He found here the rationalistic position carried out to its extreme conclusion, and its methods and results more clearly brought to view than in any more moderate system. As he says, he here learned for the existence of what kind of a God the ontological argument could be a proof. The distinction of the *principium compositionis* and the *principium generationis* was the result of his study at this time, and is the key to his position in regard to the theory of knowledge and metaphysics, as it is to the understanding of every dualistic system.

This distinction of the *Realgrund* from the *Erkenntnissgrund*, while not new in philosophy, is here for the first time made the basis for a distinct system of thought. It is Jacobi's insistence on the complete disparateness of the two principles which separates him from all monistic thinkers. The distinction is first made by Aristotle, in his recognition of the fourfold nature of causality; but in modern philosophy, with its new principle of dualism, it must assume a different position from that which it occupied in the monism of the older Greek systems. It is impossible to assume the identity or correlation of these four principles when the universe has been split into two distinct worlds, as was done in the philosophy of the 17th century. It may be that there is an ultimate harmony or identity when viewed *sub specie aeternitatis*, but modern philosophy starts from the express assumption that we cannot thus view things. The identity must first be proved. In regard to this question we are considering, the relation of the cause and reason, the necessity of this proof had not yet been clearly seen. The unity of the world in God, as the one true Substance, had seemed to account for the identity or correspondence of the subjective principle of knowledge with the objective principle of becoming. The monism of Aristotle still held sway even after its principle had been deserted. In Descartes we do not find any treat-

ment of this special subject. The discrepancy between the two series of causes is not noticed. The beginning of a more decided distinction is found in his controversy with Gassendi on the nature of the relation of cause and effect. Descartes insists on the coincidence of the two—all the effect being contained in the cause, and hence being unable to persist after the latter has ceased to be. This is the scholastic principle of *causa cessans, cessat effectus*, and shows Descartes' purely rational and ontological position. Gassendi insists on the element of *time* as essential, thus showing the influence of the scientific view which was later to claim the *causa* as wholly its own. Malebranche continues the rationalistic treatment of causality, defining a true cause as one "entre laquelle et son effet l'esprit apperçoit une liaison nécessaire."¹ It is thus evident that we must see all things in God, who can alone be the true cause. The existence of things and the reason of things must be identical.

Spinoza's system is yet more explicit than those of his predecessors. The order of being and the order of thought are coincident in their whole extent, since they are only two aspects of the same substance. He expressly recognizes the identity in his use of the expression *causa sive ratio*. So too, in speaking of the manner in which God is the cause of all things, Spinoza explains it as being the same process by which he is the *causa sui*² i. e. as being the ultimate reason or ground of his existence. The causality of God is his essence. The cause with which Spinoza is concerned, is thus not the law by which finite changes come about, but the eternal reason of the world. The law of the finite modes belongs to empirical science and cannot be deduced from the absolute attributes of God. Only as we start from the ulti-

¹ *Recherche de la Vérité*, Lib. II., c. 3.

² *Ethics* I., prop. XXV., Sch.

mate Essence can we explain the world in its totality, and it is only in its totality that we can explain it. The particular is not to be understood from the universal, but follows its own unchanging law from all eternity. And so Spinoza treats the world in his *Ethics*. He begins from his doctrine of Substance and carries it so far as is possible, and then we find a pure empiricism in the remaining discussion of the particulars of psychology. It is always, however, the reason of things which he seeks, an explanation through their *essence* and not through their antecedents.

Leibnitz also seeks *meanings* rather than causes. There is no such skeptical dualism as we find in Jacobi, and hence there is no such separation of the final and efficient causes as led to Jacobi's position. The principle of sufficient reason combines both these notions, whose distinction arises from the nature of the matter on which they are employed. Leibnitz thus states the law in the *Monadologie*:¹ "Our reasoning is founded on two great principles, (1) that of contradiction, by virtue of which we consider false that which is self-contradictory, and true that which is opposed or contradictory to the false, and (2) that of sufficient reason, by virtue of which we decide that no fact can be true or existent, and no proposition valid, unless there be a sufficient reason why it is thus and not otherwise, although these reasons are for the most part unknown to us." The existence of fact, and the validity of truth, are thus to be referred to one principle of explanation. We are forced by this necessity of seeking a reason for everything to the assumption of a supreme *Raison Suffisante* which may form the ground for all else. This supreme Monad seems to be of the nature of an organizing idea—at once force and end. The unity of substance, which had been such an important principle in Spinoza's thought, is retained by Leibnitz in his plurality of

¹ *Monadologie*, §§ 31, 32.

monads, each of which is simple and exclusive. We are still dealing with a monist in regard to knowledge, and Jacobi sees that his principle is not different from that of Spinoza. There is still no place for the individual and his freedom in the presence of this all-destroying necessity. If all things are to be explained from their essence, we have a static universe in which there can be no change nor dissolution. And it is change and self-initiation, which Jacobi would preserve.

In the writings of Wolff and his successors, we find that speculative power, which had been able in the earlier rational systems to produce unity, declining. Philosophy was divided into a rational and empirical part, between which the chasm grew ever wider. Reasons grow more rational and logical; causes, more empirical and real. Necessity is confined to the operations of the subjective intellect, while the world of science grows more and more contingent and irrational. It is in Crusius that we find the clearest expression of this distinction between the *principium generationis* and the *principium compositionis*. The change is due to the increasing influence of the scientific spirit, and we must now consider the idea of causality as developed by the empiricists.

The process is that of the derationalization of experience. Starting in Locke with the assertion that the idea of power was to be obtained from observation of the changes in nature and spirit, under the clearer analysis of Hume the theory is made to allow only a customary succession. Accepting Locke's assertion that in every change observed "the mind *must* collect a power somewhere able to make that change,"¹ Berkeley finds that power only in spirit. Hume, however, denies the certain knowledge of any source of power. In what we please to call our own experience of power, we have

¹ *Essay*, Bk. II., ch. XXI., 4.

no knowledge of the will as efficient, but know only the succession of a feeling of effort and a change produced. Of a connection between the two we have no knowledge.

Reid's answer to this result of the English empiricism was an appeal to a truer account of experience and a more moderate expectation of results. He shows that the analysis of Hume has not reached the ultimate elements. He has taken but a part of experience, leaving unexplained some of the essential and universal facts. In our search, moreover, Reid would have us "seek a *modest* certainty."

The task of philosophy is not to show a reason for all things, but to bring to light the ultimate elements of thought and so exhibit their form and meaning that they may be seen to form a harmonious whole—that is, a man must "unravel his notions and opinions till he find out the simple and original principles of his constitution, of which no account can be given but the will of our Maker. This may truly be called an *analysis* of the human faculties; and, till this is performed, it is vain we expect any just *system* of the mind—that is, an enumeration of the original powers and laws of our constitution and an explication from them of the various phenomena of human nature."¹

The result of this method of philosophizing was to exhibit in every experience the presence of certain elements which Hume had ignored. These elements Reid calls principles of common-sense, and refuses to discuss them further. They are ultimate beliefs, and incapable of further justification or explanation. To deny them is to put ourselves beyond the bounds of common-sense and practical life. This is stated by Reid with rather superfluous dogmatism and bluntness, but yet his thought is not worthy of the disregard with which it is treated by German writers generally, for his analysis is keen. The real power of his work does

¹ Reid's *Inquiry into the Human Mind*, Introd., sec. II.

not lie in its professed results, but in the analysis by which they are reached. It is his merit to have laid bare the real flaw in Locke's psychology, and to have substituted a truer notion of experience. It is the "unrelated impression" which is the moving power in Hume's skeptical work, and it is Reid's service to have corrected this false psychology by starting from the concrete judgment as the primary fact in knowledge. Over and over again he asserts that our knowledge does not begin with "mere ideas in our own mind," but with "things," by which he means a belief or judgment of existence. This result is rather a gain to psychology than to metaphysics, but yet it is an important element in showing us the real force of Hume's contention. How Reid effects a union between the matter and form of his judgments, is not explained by him, nor is the question raised. We find the whole series of ultimate principles assigned to the subject as to their origin, yet applied to the object for their content. Especially do we see this sharp dualism in his treatment of causality. He assigns a double origin to the law. As an ontological principle, he derives it from experience; as a necessary element in our knowledge, it is furnished by the mind. "I see not how mankind could ever have acquired the conception of a cause, or of any relation, beyond a mere conjunction in time and place between it and its effect, if they were not conscious of active exertions in themselves by which effects are produced."¹ "The conception of an efficient cause may very probably be derived from the experience we have had in very early life of our own power to produce certain effects. But the belief that no event can happen without an efficient cause, cannot be derived from experience."² He finds in experience something which cannot be explained from experience, and hence seeks it in the *subject* of experience. But how it is possible

¹ Hamilton's *Reid*, I., 81.

² *Ibid.*, II., 524.

to unite these two elements, Reid cannot say. He falls back on a dogmatic assertion of the necessity of the belief, enforced by a consideration of the consequences of its rejection. The analysis of Hume is by no means refuted.

The opposition which we find thus existing between the empirical and the rational principle of *causa*, is determined by the aims of the two schools in which the opposition was developed. It is not the same problem which the two principles are designed to solve. The metaphysicians are not concerned with the laws according to which each individual is determined, but with the world in its totality. They do not seek to describe, but to interpret. For the scientist, the world is necessarily infinite, and its particulars non-rational, in so far as there is always a given element in his knowledge. At no time is the world complete for him. The philosopher, on the contrary, must consider the world as a unity, in so far as its process can be expressed in a formula. It is thus ultimately rational. The result reached by philosophy will be a static formula, expressing the constant relations which obtain between the changing elements of the world process. The meaning of the parts will be interpreted in their relation to the whole. Such an exhibition of the constant form of the world—the plan on which it is constructed—would be expressed in the *principium compositionis*. The elements of time and change, necessary in any determination of the individual, do not here come into consideration. The Absolute is eternally and unchangeably one.

The empiricist, on the contrary, is concerned only with the finite in its relations with other finites. It is the law of change which is his proper subject, and in this, time is an essential element. So we have found the English writers resolving causality into succession. Their purposes are served when the law of the succession is determined—when one phenomenon can be made the sign of that which is to

follow. There is no attempt at explanation or interpretation; the task is simply to observe. It is this influence which we have found breaking up the Leibnitzian law of sufficient reason into a causal and a logical element, and it is on this division that Jacobi takes his stand. And yet he is not a pure empiricist. His problem is to reach metaphysical results by empirical methods. He will have a reality which is absolute, but it must not be a rational or necessary one. There must be absolute individuals, absolute change, absolute time, absolute finiteness. The phenomenal treatment of these subjects, as shown in Hume, he will not accept; nor on the other hand, can he disregard them as was done by the rationalists. So we find him insisting on the absolute value and truth of our experience of power in initiating action. If this experience does not deceive us, we have an immediate knowledge of the ultimate principle of *things*, of *reality* as opposed to thought. In this distinction which he makes, we see the dualism which has taken the place of the older monism. The rational principle, which had been constitutive of *all* reality, has become for Jacobi only the *logical* principle of *Grund und Folge*. It is in this sense that he opposes Spinoza's method of demonstration as leading to blank identity—to a mere universal which excludes all particulars. This examination of Spinoza's principle of procedure, we have now to consider.

As we have seen, by natural disposition and early education Jacobi was inclined to the study of being, of reality. Pietism had taught him to look at the facts of the soul life as the most undoubted realities and more worthy of study than any external phenomena. Wolffian metaphysics had led him back on Leibnitz, in whom he found an ontology which he later made his own. But when he wished to apply the rational method of thought to refute Spinoza's pantheism, he found it a useless weapon of defense, and was obliged to seek

a new basis of certainty. The text-books on logic had always told him, he says, that to understand the *principium generationis* one need only grasp the *principium compositionis*, since they were really but one principle. On this theory, however, Jacobi finds that there is no explanation of the time element in the changing world, but all things are static, geometric, as in the system of Spinoza. This failure to take into account the presence of succession he thinks is due to a confusion of our formation of a concept with the objective origin of the thing itself, for no one could be so foolish as to utterly deny the presence of change. He describes the interchange thus: "Three lines which enclose a space are the reason, the *principium essendi, compositionis*, of the three angles included in a triangle. The triangle does not exist *before* the three angles, but both are present at the same moment. And so it is whenever we find a connection of reason and consequent, we are aware only of a manifold in an idea. But because this takes place successively, and a certain time elapses, we confuse this origin (*Werden*) of the idea with the origin of the things themselves, and think that we can explain the objective succession of things in the same manner in which the subjective succession of the determinations of our concepts can be explained from their necessary connection in one idea."¹ That is, the internal succession of ideas is assumed, while the external is denied. In this process we pass over the real thing to be explained, *der Grund des Geschehens, das Innere der Zeit, das principium generationis*. Succession itself is, therefore, the incomprehensible; and the principle of sufficient reason, far from explaining the same, could only lead us to deny the reality of all succession. For if the nature of the *principium generationis* is not other than that of the *principium compositionis*, every effect must be considered as objectively co-existent with its cause.

¹ II., 193.

Hence, in this way we can never reach a concept which would explain to us the phenomena of succession, of time, or of the many."¹ In this we find the same line of argument which Hume employs to show the necessity of priority as one of the conditions determining our judgment of cause.² It is the idea of succession which must be preserved. In fact, all Jacobi's writings show a close study of Hume and admiration for his genius. The reason for it is that the Scottish skeptic furnishes the best basis for the faith of the German mystic. So Hamann considers it the chief service of Hume to have made belief the guide of life.³ In this case Jacobi goes on to consider Hume's analysis of the derivation of necessary connection from our experience of our own activity. This analysis he willingly accepts, laying emphasis on the fact that our notion of power is derived solely from the feeling of our own power in overcoming resistance. These two points, that we have a feeling of our own power and that we perceive the consequences of its application, Jacobi eagerly seizes, ignoring the skeptical consequences which Hume draws from them. He thinks that the doubt arises only from our ignorance of *how* the power is exerted, and hence is only part of our general ignorance of the nature of ultimate facts. He believes that in our inner experiences we have a real perception of the causal process or relation, and not merely of the two facts between which the connection is supposed to exist. That is, he considers Hume to mean that we really perceive the power in activity, and not merely a particular idea, followed by another idea. For Hume, our whole experience is made up of relationless atoms, no one of which involves any other. The feeling of energy is an idea on the same independent basis as the per-

¹ II., 199.² *Treatise on Human Nature*, III., sec. III.³ *Werke*, I., 405.

ception of the consequences—one is neither more real than another, nor do we have a more real knowledge of it. But Jacobi understands him as admitting a feeling of a casual *connection*, since in his own mode of thought the two terms of cause and effect stand on wholly different bases. Of the cause, the will, we have an immediate and real knowledge as an active force—as a power persisting through change of states. We are as it were inside the idea of cause and thereby know the real nature of its action, and that it does act. Of the effect we have but a secondary or analogous knowledge, since by its nature it is a *non-ego*, a *not-us*. We know it by negative terms of which the positives are taken from our own being. From a position such as this, Hume's search for the causal connection would appear useless, since it would be seeking to bring into external or objective expression that which is by nature purely internal and subjective. It is assuming that there are three distinct elements, existentially distinct, in the causal relation—the cause, the effect, and the bond between them. It is the bond which is sought and denied by Hume. But Jacobi could reply that he recognized no such division of the fact. The working of the cause could not be separated from its existence, and the immediate and inner knowledge of it could hence only be expected to coincide with its working. There could not be demanded a knowledge of the action in the effect, or of both in the same degree. Looked at externally we find only succession, and looking at it internally we are only in a position to see the cause. To know both in their relation we would have to be both at once. This defense, while possible for Jacobi, was not made by him, but was advanced by a later exponent of this will theory of causality against Hume—Maine de Biran. Its force lies wholly in the doctrine of realism which it presupposes, and must stand or fall with that. It is rather a defense than a positive position; adopted to

explain away the presumption against its realistic doctrine from the alleged absence of any experience of it. After the position had been sustained that one could not demand such experience as Hume sought, it would then be necessary to establish the positive proof on grounds of a general doctrine of realism. Such a doctrine is held by Jacobi and is here called upon indirectly to establish his position, though he uses only his common cry of *Glaube*. It is almost Reid's call upon common-sense to justify his claims. If you doubt that this which you have is a true experience of cause and effect, you can as well doubt that you stretch out your foot, move your hand, or even that you perceive an external world. "If you can be disturbed by such a doubt," he concludes, "I know no remedy for you."¹ This belief in causality is thus placed on the same level with these other primitive beliefs, and shows us the point of view from which Jacobi regarded it. It was not his purpose to establish a doctrine of the nature of the causative energy, though we have called his position the ontological one. His results on this point were due rather to his efforts to establish his realistic theory of knowledge. They are the application of this theory to the point in question. He does not seek to establish the position that will is the ultimate reality and the type of all energy, since we find it at the root of our own conscious life. This would be at variance with his intellectualism derived from the Leibnitzian doctrine of the *forma substantialis* as the real principle of existence. On the contrary, Jacobi is searching for some basis in experience for the notion of causality. It is his fundamental principle that all our knowledge is derived from certain ultimate facts of experience, of whose truth we cannot doubt, since we have no other basis on which to found our doubt. As he puts it, "Nach meinem Urtheil ist das grösste Verdienst des

¹ II., 205.

Forschers, Dasein zu enthüllen. Erklärung ist ihm Mittel, Weg zum Ziele, nächster, niemals letzter Zweck."¹ He is interested only to show that causality is an experimental notion—one of the simple ideas which are the basis of our knowledge.

But enough has been said to show that there exists an irreconcilable antipathy in Jacobi's thought to all demonstrative systems. Spinoza gave the final impulse to his development by rousing him to a consciousness of this antipathy, and to a study of its origin. In all later life, Jacobi is occupied mainly in the discovery of the Spinozistic tendencies of opposing theories. Even Leibnitz is condemned on this ground. Against such a tendency, Jacobi is ever striving, and the means which he employs is his doctrine of *Glaube*.

¹ I., 364.

PART II

DOCTRINE

1. Sources

FOR the study of Jacobi's system his dialogue of *David Hume über den Glauben, oder Idealismus und Realismus* is the best of his writings. It is characteristic that the most systematic and clear statement of his ideas should be in the form of a dialogue, and the next in value should be in letters, *Briefe über die Lehre Spinoza's*. Of writing a formal treatise, Jacobi was incapable.

In taking *David Hume* as representative of Jacobi's best thought, reference is made to his metaphysic and epistemology rather than to his personal and religious views. For a concrete presentation of his own life and that of his friends, his romances of *Woldemar* and *Allwill's Briefsammlung* should be read. The former especially shows the influences which were most powerful in determining the direction of his early life. It also gives numerous indications of his course of reading in the English moralists, among whom the moral sense writers were his favorites. His religious views are best presented in *Von den Göttlichen Dingen und ihrer Offenbarung*. His criticism of Kant is given in an appendix to the *David Hume, Ueber den transcendentalen Idealismus*, and also in a more elaborate form in the third volume of his works under the title, *Ueber das Unternehmen des Kriticismus, die Vernunft zu Verstande*

zu bringen. The former of these is by far the most valuable, as its scope is less broad. It contains his criticism of Kant's *Ding an sich* as the cause of phenomena. Besides these works, there remains an *Einleitung in die sämtliche philosophische Schriften*, prefixed to the second volume. This was his last word, written about 1814, five years before his death. It contains some reflections on his former use of terms, and a restatement of his old distinction between *Glauben* and *Wissen*.

In considering the contents of these various writings above, no notice has been taken of their relation to his later controversies, since this part of his life lies beyond the scope of this paper. We are concerned with the formation of his thought, and its relation to preceding systems, rather than with its conflicts with its successors. For completeness, however, it might be added that Jacobi's relation to Fichte is explained in the third volume of his works in the *Briefe an Fichte*, and also in some private letters contained in the second volume of his *Briefwechsel*. Schelling's position is violently attacked in *Von den Göttlichen Dingen*, but with a failure to understand his real meaning. This attack called forth a bitter review of the book by Schelling, in his *Denkmal der Schrift von den Göttlichen Dingen*, and roused a heated controversy among minor partisans of the two writers. Hegel came too late for Jacobi to attempt to refute him. He feels himself too old, and can only express his desire to "buckle on the harness anew." An elaborate discussion of these later phases of Jacobi's life can be found in Zirngiebel.¹

2. Relation of Epistemology to Ontology

At the outset of our study of Jacobi's system as a whole, we are met by this question of the relation which he bears to Kant in regard to the value of the theory of knowledge in

¹ F. H. Jacobi's *Leben, Dichten u. Denken*, passim.

philosophy. Is his realism the basis of his theory of being, or is it a part of it? Does he first examine the nature of our powers of knowing before considering their objects, or does he examine the nature of the objects in order to determine what is the power of the faculty of knowledge? Of the former method he had already had professed examples in Locke's Essay and Hume's writings, besides the works of the whole empirical school on the continent. Rationalism also had included the knowing powers among the objects of its examination, and the growing power of empiricism was tending more and more to make the question of knowledge more prominent. The powers of the soul were being minutely analyzed by the new study of psychology. A glance at the titles of the philosophical works of the second quarter of the 18th century shows the place taken by the study of the cognitive faculties. Skepticism, also, was both a result and a cause of this increased attention to knowledge.

But in all these pre-Kantian writers, it is easy to see that ontology was the recognized or unrecognized basis of the whole system. The analysis of the cognitive powers was but part of the general analysis of existence. The Kantian method, influenced though it was by former ontology, brings us to a new era in philosophizing. Whatever we may think of the validity of his method or the consistency with which he attempted to carry it out, we must recognize the fact of the revolution which Kant accomplished in the mode of approaching philosophy. Jacobi's theory, while formed before the appearance of the *Kritik*, was influenced as to its final form by this latter work. The *Briefe über die Lehre Spinoza's* appeared in 1785, and the *David Hume* in 1787. The method in this latter work, as might be expected, is similar to that of the Scotch thinker. It professes to deal with the question of knowledge before settling the nature of being, but it is not in the Kantian sense a *critical* work. It is an

examination of the contents of our mind with the view to discovering the ultimate principles contained in it, by means of which he may advance to a knowledge of existence in general. We have already seen an example of this in his discussion of causality. It is an inventory of the mind's contents which he seeks, not an analysis of the nature of knowledge as involved in each cognitive act. So far with Hume, but Jacobi does not stop here. Influenced by Kant, he gives what is known as his "psychological deduction" of the categories. Yet this is far from being a deduction in the critical sense—it is still an empirical examination of consciousness for the discovery of fact. What its value is we shall see later. We have here merely to notice that a theory of knowledge is prefixed to Jacobi's ontology. Yet the significant fact for his system is that it is really only a formal introduction and not a real basis. It seems to be a proof of the advancing, yet not fully understood, tendency toward the Kantian position. As a matter of fact, the connection between the two parts of Jacobi's system is only a mechanical one. He makes but little use of his theory of knowledge when describing his theory of being. In a sense he assumes his realistic position, but it is rather the old dogmatic method which implied an unconscious realism, than a conscious use of a professed theory. He reasons dogmatically—that is, as if things must correspond to thought, as if the realistic hypothesis were true.

We must then determine the relation between his theories of knowledge and of being otherwise than we might have done from a glance at his formal treatment of them. This formal treatment is due to the increasing influence of Kant, and is not indicative of the true growth of his system in Jacobi's mind. Must we then say that the theory of knowledge is determined by the ontology, and that Jacobi is to be classed with the earlier dogmatists of the school of Wolff?

Such a conclusion is inadmissible. As in his causal doctrine, so here, Jacobi attempts to hold a middle course between what we may call the logical and nomological views.¹ His theory of knowing was certainly the result of his ontology, but it was not a branch of it as in the rational systems—it was a thing apart, determined by the rest, but not included in it. The problem of knowledge had already been brought into too great prominence to allow a thinker like Jacobi to pass it by, or include it in a general system as a subordinate part. It had become a distinct question. Others beside Kant had been roused from their dogmatic slumbers, though their awakening may have been but partial. Hume's influence in Germany was great, and many had grafted his empiricism on their former rationalism, or replaced one by the other. Jacobi had been one of these latter. We have seen how his Geneva study carried him into the midst of the empiricists, and how he had been led to a deeper study of the dogmatists in order to discern what was that element of truth in their thought which continued to vitalize demonstrations whose worthlessness he had long felt. This glance at his mental history is enough to show that he could not be a blind dogmatist, elaborating an ontological system with as perfect certainty as if Hume had never lived. He had gone through the same schools in which Kant had gained his experience, besides possessing a far truer appreciation of the history of philosophy. He had also followed with delight the pre-critical writings of Kant, the reading of whose *Einzig mögliche Beweissgrund* induced such palpitation of the heart from excitement, that he was forced to stop several times for calmness. Such a man was quite awake to

¹ By the logical theory is here meant that view of the necessary laws which makes them the product of abstract thought, what Jacobi means by "the method of demonstration." The nomological, on the contrary, seeks a mere succession of phenomena, is wholly contingent.

the importance of the critical question, and if he did not fully appreciate Kant's answer to it, this was not because he did not feel the need for an answer. He makes a *spring*, as he calls it, but it is with his eyes open, and because forced to it by his religious needs. This gives us the key to his position. Both his systematic ontology and epistemology are conditioned by his religious ideas. As Kant sets before him the ideal of knowledge, whether absolutely or hypothetically, and seeks the conditions upon which alone this ideal is possible; so Jacobi sets before him his ideals of God, Freedom and Immortality, seeking the conditions upon which alone we can reach a knowledge of them. In Jacobi's case we may take his ideals either absolutely or hypothetically, but in his personal belief there can be no doubt that he takes the absolute view. These ideals for him are true, and hence can only be known as such in this way; but for others who have not these ideals, there is no force in his statement. These are the fixed points of his theory—the absolute facts which are to be accepted and not explained. He is born with them, so to speak, educated in them from childhood. His stay in Geneva cannot shake his faith in them, though he is immersed in studies which, according to Le Sage, "were fitted to make libertines of any one who had not Jacobi's principles."¹ Possessed by such ideas as these, he cannot sit down calmly to work out a system which may or may not confirm him in his faith. He cannot start from anything more certain than these in order to demonstrate their existence, for he has nothing of which he is more sure. They are bound up in his own existence, and no system can thus destroy itself—each organism is bound to self-preservation. In thus making the moral ideas the ultimate end of philosophy, he recognizes his affinity with Kant, with whose destructive work he is in full sympathy.

¹ *Briefe*, I., 6.

Belief is the end of philosophy for both—knowledge must be cleared away for faith. But with Jacobi, philosophy must also *begin* with faith—in this constructive work he parts company with Kant, and in consequence reaches a faith which differs widely from that of the practical reason.

We cannot then say, that Jacobi was a pure dogmatist in the old rational style, nor, on the other hand, that he was critical. If we enlarge the meaning of ontology so that it covers the whole *Weltansicht*—the whole sphere of what man considers of ultimate worth—then we may consider Jacobi's theory of knowledge as a necessary part of this system. It is assumed to furnish a guarantee for the truth of certain ideas. But if we restrict ontology to the mere elaboration of a system of concepts—to the explanation of the inner being of things, of which knowledge is but an incident—then Jacobi's theory is a thing apart. Inasmuch, however, as it is not distinctly critical, it is more fitting to consider the theory of knowing after the theory of being.

3. *Ontology*

In considering Jacobi's doctrine on this point, we have to do, not with anything distinctly original on his part, but rather with his adaptation of a theory or phase of thought which forms one of the distinctive features of that age. It is rather a phase of thought than a definite theory, as we find it in that period, for it takes on many forms. It finds its clearest expression in Leibnitz, and the general doctrine may best be distinguished as "individualism." This principle, raised to a system by Leibnitz, though seemingly akin to the subjectivism of Descartes, contains a fundamentally different idea. Descartes, in the spirit of the modern world, brings back all certainty, all knowledge, to the conscious self. The value of all external to the Ego is placed below that of the Ego itself. The certainty of all truths is tested

by this standard of their clearness and distinctness for the individual subject. The departure is made from thought, and, for Descartes, thought means the thought of an individual thinker. But that this subjectivism was not identical, or inseparably united with, an individualism, is seen in its development into Spinozism, which was the system which Leibnitz' doctrine was expressly designed to meet. As he says, "Spinoza would be right, were there no Monads." But since there are these individual existences, Spinoza is wrong. It would seem then that there is an antagonism between these two principles if they are thus pronounced by Leibnitz incompatible with each other, but it is not necessarily so. One is a theory of knowing, the other is a doctrine of being. It is only when there is no distinction recognized between their two spheres, that the theories tend to be exclusive, as in the case of Spinoza. The nature of thought is universal, and when made the basis of being we get a pantheism, or monism. Kant starts from Leibnitz and never frees himself wholly from his influence, but in his successors we find the result of his emphasis on the problem of knowledge. Subjectivism may be combined with an individualistic theory of being, as in the Empiricists, but their tendency is rather skeptical than ontological. Leibnitz then, in bringing forward his Monads in answer to the monism of Spinoza, does not directly attack the theory of knowledge on which the latter was founded, but introduces a new element which he considers overlooked in the system of Spinoza. He does not start from our *knowledge* of things, but from *things* as known, and thus is not so concerned about the method or theory of knowledge. He is a physicist, and as such, he finds that the notion of force has no place in the Cartesian systems. These are concerned with that which can be known and demonstrated—the certainty of their knowledge is the object of their care. Leib-

nitz looks at the objects known. He seeks the real and finds it in the individual. His own existence becomes the type of all others, and knowledge assumes a secondary place. The Monads are facts, and condition all our knowledge.

Jacobi thus states the principle: "The indivisible in any being determines its individuality or makes it a real whole, and all those beings whose manifold we see inseparably united in a unity, and which we can only distinguish according to this unity, are called individuals (we may assume or not that the principle of their unity has consciousness)."¹ Wherever, then, we find a real existence—wherever we recognize a true whole—there we must have a unifying principle. Human power can never produce such an object. The unity of art or scientific construction lies not in the object, but in the creative mind. "The soul of such a thing is the soul of another." When we comprehend five objects in one representation so that they form a kind of unity, this unity does not lie in the objects—these have no inner tendency to unite in the number five or any other number. Their momentary union is due merely to our own action upon them—it is the ideal unity of the idea, not the real unity of existence. In order to think this latter we must think a whole which is before its parts. This we find in our own being. Our body is composed of an endless number of parts, which are constantly being renewed so that no one of them can be considered a necessary part of our being. Yet we feel this manifold as inseparably united by virtue of an invisible form which remains permanent amidst the flux of matter. This form, which can neither be mathematical nor physical, but yet must be real, else the unity of consciousness could not be preserved, may be called, with Leibnitz, a metaphysical point, *forma substantialis, vinculum compositionis*, or *Monad*. Of this we can form no idea, though we have

¹ II., 209.

the most certain consciousness of it. It is our inmost self, the source of all consciousness, and hence behind all attempt at representation. Were we to form an idea of it we should have to get outside ourself, to distinguish ourself from ourselves. But it is always the union of both subject and object. No matter how far we may carry our abstractions, the subject is as far as ever from becoming its own object. Hence, though we can never form any representation of the soul, we have its reality asserted in every act of consciousness as the organizing power in knowledge and existence. It is a definite form of life, which is never the product of things, for things are merely forms of life. "Where unity, real individuality, ceases, there ceases all existence, and when we represent as an individual that which is no individual, we are introducing our own unity into a mere aggregate." The individual then is the only real. Jacobi's starting point is thus not knowledge, but life. While he identifies the two in many places, we can see from the whole bent of his mind that it is only in extent that they are thus identical, and not in importance. Consciousness is not made the source of life or its essence, but rather its manifestation. As he puts it above, "the soul is a certain definite form of life," and not *vice versa*. The life of the soul does not consist in having ideas, for it exists before the ideas, and persists through unconscious states. As he asserts against Spinoza, the soul must first be something for itself before it can be something for any other being—that is, before the idea of a relation can arise there must exist both terms of the relation of which it is the idea.

What is meant by the principle of life or consciousness is hard to determine. With Leibnitz, Jacobi would seem to recognize a consciousness of low degree in all forms of life, though in some passages he leaves it open whether it is so or not. Yet the following passage distinctly implies the

existence of some such power of receiving "impressions," whatever he means by these. "Life and consciousness are one. The higher degree of consciousness depends on the number and nature of the perceptions united in consciousness. Every perception expresses at the same time something external and something internal, both in relation to each other. Every perception is consequently in itself already a concept. As the action, so the reaction. Is the power of receiving impressions so manifold and complete that an articulate echo rises in consciousness, there arises above the impression, the Word. There appears what we call reason, what we call Person."¹ There is here the distinction of perception and apperception as taken from Leibnitz, but we cannot draw any definite conclusions as to what is the nature of this preconscious consciousness, which is thus correlated with all forms of life. At times he seems to be speaking of physical life when he contrasts or compares it with the soul, and yet he regards the whole physical world as merely the phenomenon of which spirit is the real. "What is body? What is organic body? All nothing, all a shadow without a trace of actual being, were not first form given to it through substance, through a world of spirits, did we not start from the pure simplicity of life. Therefore, every, even the smallest system, demands a spirit which unites, moves, and binds together—a Lord and King of life."² He must be speaking then of a mental substance, when he mentions these impressions on it before the dawn of conscious life. He is not thinking of the nervous organism as needing a certain degree of development and stimulation before an echo arises in the mind, but of a certain grade of soul life itself. Whenever he speaks of life, it must be in this sense, as one with consciousness or the rudiments of consciousness. With him the soul is the only real, and

¹ II., 262.² II., 273.

all else is but the manifestation of it to ourselves, or to other souls. The forms of the physical world are signs of the position, relation and nature of non-physical unities. Organic unity is the one form of true being, and the highest form of this is consciousness. And this is all which can be asserted in regard to the nature of the soul—it is the force which unifies the data of sense. It is not merely the synthetic unity of apperception necessary to knowledge, but an active power as the foundation of this. The “I think” which accompanies or may be discerned in all consciousness, does not give Jacobi all he wishes to secure. He is not seeking a basis for necessary knowledge, but for existence, and hence must have a fact which persists, with or without consciousness. He has no fear of the blind, irrational element in nature, but is willing to adopt it as the ultimately real—as the substance below all knowledge. In speaking of the nature of sense, he says, “It is the office of the senses to receive and transmit impressions. To transmit to *whom*? *Where* occurs this aggregation of impressions? And what were accomplished with this mere aggregation? Plurality, relation, are *living* ideas which presuppose a *living* being which can actively receive the manifold into its own unity.”¹ And again, “Such an individual (a self-determining one) must be something in and for itself, else it would never be anything for another, nor be able to receive this or that chance determination. It must, in and for itself, exert power, else it were impossible that any result arise through it, be continued or even appear in it.”²

In discussing the office of the reason in knowledge, he identifies it with perception. “Every percept is at the same time a concept.” The only power of the soul is thus the reception and involuntary classification of sense data. Immediately on presentation, every element of knowledge is

¹ II., 271.² II., 244.

seized by the mind and recognized in its proper relations. As Jacobi's companion in the dialogue puts it, it would seem that "the reason came from without," that all which makes the individuality of a man is due to the action of the object on him, while the subject has merely the reception and arrangement of this material. The variety of the individual life is thus merely the mirror of the world, and we have a world of mirrors with nothing else to reflect. It is the same objection raised to Leibnitz' theory—there is no content of life. It would thus be the direct negative of that which the doctrine was designed to defend—individuality. It is the Absolute Objectivity in place of the Absolute Subjectivity, rather than the combination of the two which was desired. Jacobi places both on the same level, object and subject, but in his truest moments, that is, when he speaks from his religious consciousness, it is the object which predominates. *Ohne Du, kein Ich*, but it is the *Du* which absorbs his attention. Perception is to him merely the remains of union—the channel through which the object is conveyed to the subject, and in which he recognizes "the secret grasp of the Creator." Through this alone is the creative act accomplished. "A shudder seizes me as often as I think on this. It is as though in that moment I received my soul immediately from the hand of the Creator."¹ The principle of individuality with which Jacobi started seems irreconcilable with such a conclusion as is here reached. His method of reconciliation is given in the same passage from which this last quotation is taken. Knowledge is not *given* through the senses, but produced. "We must assert, not only of the knowledge which we call *a priori*, but of all knowledge in general, that it is not given through the senses, but can only be produced through the living and active power of the soul."² That is, in Jacobi's eyes, because the facts of knowledge are, as it were,

¹ II., 272.² II., 272.

expressed in subjective *material*, they are therefore expressions of a distinct individuality and not merely the mirror of objective relations. He goes on to say that by calling the senses a "means" of separation and union, the substantiality of the terms united are presupposed. Yet he gives us no new account of what is comprised in this substantiality. The only description is the one already quoted in the opening of this account of his doctrine of being, that the only substance is the organizing power as known in the self. And this power has proved to be only that of registering the reports of the senses. The reason is a continued perception of relations given in nature—it is the following out of this system of the objective world. These relations are expressed in terms or categories natural to the subject, but they are at the same time those of the object. We have thus a conception of the mind as a bundle of general notions filled in by experience, as the product of an external stimulus on the sense organs. As a distinct individual, the soul has vanished, and we have only the mirror of other mirrors. Or if we interpret the object as having still a real existence, we have a series of centres in which universal notions or laws came to a consciousness of themselves. The only real things are the perceptions which unite these centres of consciousness with the One Source of all being, which Source would be again only the centre of these other centres. We must seek Jacobi's meaning, then, by a reference to his fundamental thought. His attempt to put his meaning into words is unsuccessful, as is natural in one of his temperament. The principle which he has put at the head of this discussion and which we have been following out, is not natural to him, nor does it contain his real starting point. As has been already emphasized, life, not knowledge, is his real basis. The intellectualism of Leibnitz does not sit well on him. He uses it only to explain his thought and not to form it, and hence when he tries to

state his deepest convictions, it fails him. So here. It is really not the intellectual monad which he takes as the fundamental fact in his theory of the soul, but the irrational life of feeling. The only similarity between the two conceptions is found in the doctrine of unconscious mental modes, which seems to coincide with a theory of feeling, blind feeling, as the basis of life. But Jacobi's feeling is the non-rational, not the unconscious of Leibnitz.

In describing his doctrine above, Jacobi's own account has been followed and must be accepted as his explicit theory; but in order to understand the manner in which it presented itself to his own mind we have to recognize a wide distinction between his own thought and that of his professed master. His own thought was not clear on this subject, as is shown in the change in his use of *Verstand* and *Vernunft*. In later life, the latter, instead of being considered the faculty of principles, becomes identified with the *Gefühl*. This shows his growing recognition of the importance of *feeling* in his system. It is no longer a separate faculty of the soul, but the true reason itself—the peculiar glory of man. Its position then is exactly the reverse of that which it holds in the system of Leibnitz. Instead of being undeveloped consciousness, feeling becomes the goal of all development. The whole rational organism is only for the combining of facts given in feeling. There could be no sharper contrast than between the *petites perceptions* of Leibnitz, and Jacobi's *Gefühle*.

Psychology is the source of Jacobi's philosophy. The facts which he finds there are for him of objective validity. The hypotheses which he builds on them are only general expressions of these facts. He is not concerned to analyze or abstract to any great extent, lest he lose hold of the individual and be left with the logical abstractions which he hates.

The primary fact of his own life, as of all his associates in that period, was feeling. All science, all art, all religion, was of value only as ministering to the individual life of emotion. It was not the practical homocentric idea of the *Aufklärung*, which was rather external and hard, but the deifying of spontaneity and emotion. The ideal life was the ecstatic life, for which all knowledge was but the occasion for rapture. This idea dominates Jacobi in his ontology. Knowledge must be grasped by the emotional self before its function is complete. At the root of this self there seems to be a solid something which defies all attempt to bring it into knowledge. It is an ultimate feeling—a dead weight, of which we are conscious as ever present, but whose meaning and nature we cannot fathom. About and around this solid centre, seems to play the whole fantasy of knowledge, lighting up the surrounding sphere, but unable to penetrate the depths of this inscrutable reality. Not that this centre is supposed dead in the sense that it has no active part in mental life, or no connection with consciousness, but that the ultimate mental fact, when we try to comprehend it, is one of baffled effort—a feeling of pain that closes the door to further analysis from the psychological side. So in every attempt to analyze that which is for our powers incapable of analysis—we end in a feeling of dead strain. This, for Jacobi, is the end of all research—*das Einfache, das Unauflösliche*. Behind this simple feeling, he sees only a great darkness, into which one must spring blindly if he would go further. Writing to Hamann in 1783, he describes it as an immense dark gulf opening before him. The purpose of *Woldemar* was to make this evident. "I would follow him deeper into his life, and show in the noblest philosophy known to me, the great gulf which I myself have found therein." In regard to the possibility of piercing this darkness, he writes, "Light is in my heart,

but as soon as I would bring it into my understanding, it is quenched.”¹

The system of Leibnitz cannot meet the demands which Jacobi would make on it. Nor can any rational system comprehend within its limits that life of feeling which was brought into prominence by this romantic movement. The terms feeling and thought are incommensurable when taken in their abstractness. What Jacobi is interested in, is not thought as a system of concepts about life, but life itself. It is an idle task for him to seek to formulate his beliefs, for it cannot be done with the materials which he had at command. For that period, the distinction between what is thought and what is felt was absolute. Their unity in one consciousness was not recognized in its full meaning. It was not the problem of knowledge as such, but this or that knowledge in particular. It is this which leaves Jacobi's ontology in the air, and makes his attempt to formulate one an anomaly. To see this more clearly, and also his half conscious recognition of the fact, we have to examine his theory of knowledge.

4. *Epistemology*

The problem of knowledge takes on some such form as this: “How can I, who am a self-centred, independent being, the essence of whose nature can at best be but vaguely expressed by the term *Trieb*, reach a knowledge of myself, the outer world, and God?” The main point here is, that the individual exists apart from all other existences, and that his knowledge, or at least his faculties, are equally individual. Consciousness is not the presupposition of the theory, but is an additional thing called in afterward. It is not this consciousness in general which is to be explained, but the particular acts of knowledge whereby the individual

¹ I., 366, 367.

subject is informed of something which is not himself. "How do I reach this revelation of existence?" is the question for solution.

The nature of the answer is determined by the form in which the problem is stated, and this is taken from the popular thought of that period. What Reid calls the "ideal theory," was prevalent among the great body of minor writers of the century, and also to some extent among more notable men, though not in the crude form which Reid attacks. The subjectivism of Descartes, bringing all knowledge to the test of clearness in consciousness, had given rise to the notion that all knowledge was of ideas in the individual mind, and hence that all error must lie in the application of these ideas beyond the mind. The immediate certainty is *self*—the external world is known with a secondary, derived certainty. Because we can control some of our ideas and not others, arises the distinction of self and not-self—the former being the sum of the ideas which we can control to some extent. The only facts which we possess are data of sense. Substantial existence is known only by reasoning. If the validity of reasoning is questioned, all goes. So in Hume's skepticism. He had but to destroy the necessary validity of our notion of causality and the whole fabric of knowledge dissolved into the relationless impressions of which it had been built. Reid considers the next step would be for these ideas to fall foul of each other and leave nothing at all in the world. But the subjective presupposition was too firmly rooted in 18th century thought for them to see the absurdity of their position. Their ideas were inside them—they owned them—though who it was who owned them, and how they knew him, were problems hard to answer, even if they cared to state them. Yet there must be a cause for these ideas—if we don't produce them ourselves, an external somewhat must do so. The nature of this x we may not

know, but its existence must be certain, since we can prove it necessary to explain our impressions. So reasoned the majority of thinkers during the first half of the 18th century. The point which Jacobi makes against them is a purely psychological one, and one which they cannot resist, though they exclaim loudly at his unheard-of use of terms.

Here is his dialogue with a friend whom Hamilton would call a hypothetical realist.

"I—Answer me now, do you believe that I am sitting talking with you here?

"He—I do not merely *believe* it; I *know* it.

"I—How do you know it?

"He—Because I feel it.

"I—You *feel* that I am sitting here talking with you? That is wholly inexplicable to me. What? I, as I sit here, as I talk, am a mere *feeling* to you?

"He—You are not a feeling, but the external cause of my feeling. The feeling together with its cause gives me the idea which I call you."

Jacobi then goes on to ask him how he knows that his feeling of a cause represents a real, external cause.

"He—This I know from the evidence of the senses. The certainty which I have of it is an immediate certainty, like that which I have of my own existence."¹

This brings out his Kantian position, which Jacobi declares is of no avail to a true realist, since it is the question of the value of sense evidence which is at stake. That is, Jacobi is not satisfied to be an empirical realist in Kant's sense, but claims a certainty of transcendent reality. It is his aim to expose the necessary ideality of the critical system which animates much of his work. But with Kant's analysis of the facts of consciousness, he is at one. That is, he emphasizes the corresponding reality of subject and object in knowledge.

¹II., 141.

To this position he succeeds in bringing his friend in the dialogue, who thus is finally made to express the true state of things: "I experience that I exist, and that something external to me exists in the same indivisible moment; and in this moment my soul is affected by objects no more than by itself. No idea (*Vorstellung*), no reasoning, effects (*vermittelt*) this two-fold revelation. Nothing intervenes in the soul between the perception of the actual external to it and the actual within it. Ideas as yet are not; they appear first later, in reflection, as shadows of things which *were* present. Moreover, we can always trace them back to the real from which they were taken and which they presuppose; and this we must do whenever we would know their truth."¹ And again, "in the first and simplest perception there must be *das Ich* and *das Du*, inner consciousness and external object existing together in the soul; both in the same moment, without before or after, without any operation of the understanding, nay even without in the slightest beginning the production of the notion of cause and effect." What Jacobi is here attempting is to formulate a doctrine which Hamilton would call one of presentative perception or Natural Realism,³ and the object of his attack is, on the one hand, Absolute Idealism, and, on the other, Hypothetical Realism. The former, as looking forward to the idealistic development from Kant; the latter, as looking backward to the popular philosophy of the *Aufklärung*. The common element in both is the supposition of a *Ding an sich*, of which our idea is only representative. This, of course, is only true of the Kantian beginnings of Idealism, as existing at this date.

We have designated Jacobi's theory by a name taken from

¹ II., 175.

² II., 176.

³ Hamilton's *Reid*, II., 816 (7th ed.).

Hamilton's classification, but it is far from our purpose to follow the subtleties of that ingenious writer through all the minute subdivisions of possible theories of Realism, and determine just which class is made for our author. We will accept the general term and consider Jacobi as worthy of it, though Hamilton will only cautiously admit him to such an honor, by remarking in a foot-note, "This looks very like Natural Realism."¹ The general doctrine is stated by him thus: "The Presentationists or Intuitionists constitute the object, of which we are conscious in perception, into a sole, absolute, or total object; in other words, reduce perception to an act of immediate or intuitive cognition: and this . . . by viewing the one total object of perceptive consciousness as real, as existing."²

This in general gives a concise statement of the realistic position of Jacobi, but its meaning is not easy to understand. What does he mean by immediate knowledge? Paradoxical as it seems, it is really the attempt to rid knowledge of the thought element in it. Modern philosophy begins with a breaking up of the unconscious monism of earlier times, and the substitution of the Cartesian dualism. This subjectivism thus introduced developed steadily until, as we have seen, the world was regarded as known only in idea. This empirically subjective standpoint reached its end in the deadlock between Wolff and Hume, when a new construction of existence seemed necessary. This was possible in two ways: either deny the existence of any reality beyond thought, or else deny the legitimacy of interposing a *tertium quid* between the subject and his object. The new Dualism chose this latter way. "We do not know ideas, but *things*" is its constant formula. This we see in the passage quoted from Jacobi above. The idea (*Vorstellung*) does not appear in the original act of perception, but

¹ Hamilton's *Reid*, II., 794.

² *Ibid.*, II., 816.

is the result of later reflection. What we have is an immediate recognition of both Ego and non-Ego in the same act. This rests apparently on a threefold division of the cognitive act or state of consciousness into subject, object and cognition. The two elements are supposed existing external to each other. The consciousness which the one has of the other is conceived as a third thing added to the problem, and not as an original constitutive part without which neither of the two primary factors exists.¹ What the realist would do, then, is to minimize the importance of the third party in the operation, which he indicates by calling our knowledge immediate. The subject and object are now conceived as face to face, staring immediately into each other's being, and testifying directly to each other's existence. Thus this third thing which was made to mediate between the original parties—this mischievous idea—is of no further use when we would get at ultimate proof. We cannot use it as a basis of argument, as a premise from which to reach reality behind it, for it is no longer there. We have subject and object given with equal certainty. So far Jacobi goes with Kant in regard to the empirically known fact of knowledge. But now Kant raises the further problem, what reality do I ascribe to this subject and object thus known? It is true that the crude hypothesis of a *tertium quid* through which we know objects, is a pure fiction—all knowledge is in its beginning intuitive, presentative, *anschaulich*. But when we have said this, we have said all. The object thus given is merely a subjective one—the *Ding an sich* remains behind all this show of phenomena. Jacobi must take a further step in his position.

This object of immediate knowledge is not a new phenomenon—not a state of consciousness but a numerically different existence. How do you know? asks the Kantian. I

¹ III., 225, 143.

have an immediate certainty of it, is Jacobi's ultimate reply. This is the only answer possible on his theory. What is, is. Brute facts must stop all ingenious theories. Into the nature of the brute fact, he does not go. *Glaube* and *Wunder* are the only terms in which to express the nature of the certainty, and the method of the knowledge of ultimate reality. "The decided Realist, who unhesitatingly accepts an external existence, on the evidence of his senses, considers this certainty as an original conviction, and cannot but think, that on this fundamental experience, all our speculation touching a knowledge of the external world, must rest—such a decided Realist, how shall he dominate the means through which he obtains his certainty of external objects, as of existences independent of his representation of them? He has nothing on which his judgment can rest, except the things themselves—nothing but the fact that the objects stand there, actually before him. In these circumstances, can he express himself by a more appropriate word, than revelation (*Offenbarung*)?"¹ "The element of all human knowledge and activity is *Glaube*."²

"How can we strive for certainty unless we are already in possession of some certainty? And how can it be known to us save through that which we already know with certainty? This leads us to the idea of an immediate certainty, which needs no proof, but absolutely excludes all proof, being itself alone the idea (*Vorstellung*) corresponding with the represented object, and hence having its reason in itself. The conviction from proof is a conviction at second hand; it rests on comparison, and can never be quite sure and complete. If then, every holding for true not arising from rational grounds, is *Glaube*, then the conviction from rational grounds is itself derived from *Glaube*, and receives its power from it alone. Through *Glaube* we know that we

¹ II., 165.² IV., 223.

have a body and that other bodies and other thinking beings exist external to us. A truly wonderful relation! For we have only a sensation (*empfinden*) of our body in this or that modification; and yet while we feel our body so affected, we are at the same time aware, not only of its modifications, but also of that which is wholly different, which is neither sensation nor thought, but other real things, and this with as much certainty as we have of our own existence, for without a *Du*, is the *Ich* impossible."¹ We see all through these quotations, that effort to minimize the thought element which is the essence of the realistic construction. The more nearly passive the subject is, the more clearly will he receive the truth. It is as if Jacobi were regarding a moral question, and insisting that the mind be freed from all passions which might disturb the purity of its decision. We must be cleared of self that we may know the not-self. All intervention of thought action serves to distort the pure image of reality which it is our highest aim to see. Thus in his psychology, Jacobi makes the *Verstand* wholly subordinate to the two perceptive faculties, *Vernunft* and *Sinn*. Sometimes he almost seems to discard the middle term altogether, and leave nothing but the receptivity of the soul.

But if this is his tendency, what does he leave as the elements of knowledge, or as the primary truths which are our ultimates? Obviously only a *given* element, an unformed feeling or sensation. He is not a crude Realist, trying to establish the existence of a material world as we know it. He does not claim that the individual object exists in the same color, shape or size in which it appears to us, but that there is a somewhat independent of us which determines an object to be this rather than that—a principle or principles of individuation. The fact of existence is what he seeks to establish. But in his contention he combines two distinct

¹ IV., 210.

positions, which much detracts from the clearness of his argument. One is, that the object is not constituted for us by thought; the other, that the existence of the object is not proved to us by thought.

Against the latter position he maintains Kant's argument that pure thought as analytic cannot demonstrate existence—cannot go beyond its premises, which must be given in intuition. To this end he makes that psychological analysis of perception which was quoted above. Its force is to bring out the equal originality of the subject and object in knowledge, by virtue of which fact one element cannot be used as the means to prove the existence of the other. The presence of thought in this process is thus easily disproved, since by thought he means reflective thought, *Verstand*. But now Jacobi turns the same arguments against the other position. Not only are subject and object given as correlatives in knowledge, but this distinction is also one of things independent of our consciousness. The empirically given is also transcendently given. Thought has no more to do with constituting the object of which we are immediately conscious than it has in bringing us to this consciousness. Space and time are not thought forms and hence object forms, but thought forms *because* object forms. And so it is with causality. The psychological deduction which Jacobi opposes to the Kantian deduction of the categories is based on this idea of deriving these fundamental notions from the existence of objects, rather than from the conditions of our knowing them. Its starting point is from the notion of two things existing in relation to each other. From this follow space, reaction, interaction, causality, succession, time. The merit claimed for this process is that it gives us notions whose universality and necessity is derived from the existence and community of single things in general, rather than from the fact that they are mere predispositions of the

human mind of which we must be cured in order to know things in themselves.¹ The whole question is begged, of course, in the primary supposition of the community of individual existences, but the idea of the deduction shows very clearly Jacobi's psychological standpoint. The problem of consciousness belonged to the generation after him—to a generation whose thought Jacobi confesses he cannot understand.

This deduction, then, is merely explanatory. It is an unfolding of the notions contained in a primary assumption. This assumption is that of dualism. Granted this primary fact, and all else follows. The method by which we reach this fact is again the immediate one of intuition. We *believe* that objects exist independent of us, and exercise causality between themselves and us. We have no other grounds for believing this than the fact that we *feel* it to be so. We are immediately conscious that there is some resistance to our own will—that we only come to a consciousness of ourselves in this knowledge of a not-ourselves. We cannot do other than trust this testimony without lapsing into a pure Idealism. If any one chooses to accept this alternative, there is no way in which to refute him, for there can be no reason for an ultimate—it witnesses to itself. Jacobi thus refuses to discuss the idealistic position, or, rather, he is unable to grasp the meaning of its contention. To him, thought is always the thought of the empirical subject. He is unconsciously and necessarily dualistic from the beginning. Consciousness, as such, is never considered. The point is always how the subjective thought can reach a certainty beyond it—a knowledge of that which is not thought.

To provide for this need, Jacobi finds the faculty of *Glaube*, *Gefühl*, or *Vernunft*, which he describes as "the faculty of the setting before us of the in itself true, good,

¹ II., 215.

and beautiful, with perfect certainty of their objective validity."¹ Jacobi's accounts of this faculty, however, are by no means exact or fixed. It appears sometimes as a power of perception corresponding to the senses proper, but differing in the sphere to which it is applied. In this sense, it is a faculty of rational intuition, and is expressly connected with Kant's denial of such a power. Kant maintained that the ideas must be empty because they had no intuition corresponding to that by which the concepts of the understanding received their content, and it is Jacobi's theory that there is this intellectual or *Vernunft Anschauung*. This position is one which becomes clearer toward the close of Jacobi's life, and assumes its most definite form in the *General Introduction* to his works prefixed to the second volume. But though making the most symmetrical system, and perhaps the most plausible, this conception of *Vernunft* as a faculty which presents to us immediate perceptions of the intelligible world, is not the one which we generally find in Jacobi's thought. As we have remarked before, the truest conception of Jacobi's meaning is generally to be found in his less systematic writings. Making allowance for this peculiarity, we are brought to the idea of the *Vernunft* as the faculty of ratification, so to speak. That is, it guarantees the validity of truths, rather than brings new ones to the mind. Jacobi has earlier identified it with the *Glaubenskraft*, or *Vermögen des Gefühls*, and these names give us the correct idea of it. As he puts it, "it is the faculty by which the truth in and above the appearance, reveals itself in a manner incomprehensible to the senses and understanding."² And again, he speaks of "the intuition of reason, which affords us a knowledge of supersensible objects, that is, affords us *assurance of their reality and truth*."³ The last clause explains the true meaning of *Vernunft* as the source

¹ II., II.² II., 73.³ II., 59.

of the certainty of objective truth. In fact it is impossible to give any other interpretation of the term rational intuition than this latter. It cannot be compared with the intuition of sense save by analogy. This may be more clearly shown by consideration of the facts which are supposed to be given by this faculty. These are primarily, God, Freedom and Immortality. Take the first of these ideas. It is impossible to hold that the mind reaches a complete and definite presentation of this idea similar to that which it has of a sense object. In so far as it is individual, or even expressed or presented to the mind, it is conceived in terms borrowed from sense itself. That is, there is no order of signs peculiar to the reason as such. Jacobi himself never speaks of these notions in any way which would imply the contrary. When he describes God as personal, he recognizes the fact that this term is borrowed from experience, and does not or may not express what God is in himself. In a letter to Lavater he agrees that God cannot be equally personal to every one, but yet that he must be represented so in every *Vorstellung*.¹ This idea of personality is thus the product of each man's reflection on his own life. Yet as we saw in considering Jacobi's discussion of the nature of the soul, the Ego is rather an hypothesis than a given fact. It is drawn from our observation of external organisms. We see that it is the presence of a principle of unity which distinguishes a living being from a mere thing, and we transfer this idea to our own being. The idea of God therefore is derived from the highest notion of our own being, which in turn is derived from external observation compared with internal experience. Thus the whole series moves by analogy. It is true that in another letter to Lavater, Jacobi asserts that our own personality is borrowed from that of God, that it is but "a broken beam of the transcendental Light of the only

¹ *Briefe*, I., 447.

Living,"¹ but this is in regard to its being, not our knowledge of it. The real source of this knowledge, even for intuitionists, is not a direct presentation by a special faculty, but an interpretation of the whole sum of moral phenomena by an instinctive and relatively immediate judgment. In a sense, every man agrees that God is a name for the *moralische Weltordnung*—where the difference arises, is in the interpretation of this fact. The real meaning of the statement that we have an intuitive knowledge of God, is then, that we instinctively feel the suitability of applying a certain conception to a certain order of facts—that is, it expresses the relation of a fact or idea to a man's moral judgment. The man feels that such an idea alone agrees with that standard of worth which represents his own inmost being. It finds him—it forms the final element in that inmost circle of ideas which he knows to be himself. It is the appropriating power of the mind, drawing to itself those elements of thought which are most consonant with its own nature.

So in regard to the other rational ideas. Freedom and Immortality are not individual facts to be *perceived*, but theories to be *believed*. We cannot perceive *Freedom*, but at most might know that an action was *free*. Immortality is not an existence but a predicate of beings. The distinction must be observed between the real and the valid. These ideas may have validity, but if so, this does not demand that the whole content of the truth be a "given" one—an intuition. Yet this distinction Jacobi nowhere makes, and the consequence is his vacillating use of the terms *Vernunftanschauung* and *Gefühl*. He gives the same answer to the two distinct questions, (1) By what means do I reach these ideas? (2) How do I know they are true? This answer is, as we have seen, through feeling. The object both comes to

¹ *Briefe*, I., 436

us through feeling, and is known as true by feeling, What Jacobi means is the latter statement, and it was only the exigencies of defense which drove him to claiming the former. Such a position would force him to assign our highest and most complex ideas to a simple perception as their source. At times he does seem to make these ideas ultimate in their nature, but again he is too good a psychologist to hazard such a statement. The immediate feeling of God, is an immediate certainty of the validity of that notion, and not a description of the process by which the notion arises. We do not believe it because of any theory as to this process of its growth in consciousness, but because we judge it good in itself. It is logical mediation in our belief, and not psychological mediation in the object, to which *Glaube* is opposed.

Such an analysis as has been given above of the meaning of Jacobi's *Vernunftanschauung*, may seem at variance with the commonly received notion of it, and it may be well to consider it more at length. It is not claimed, however, that this meaning is the only one which may be found in his writings. His terms vary not only with advancing age, but also with his moods, and we can do no more than determine what meaning it is which is most in accordance with possibility.

It is generally understood that Jacobi comes to his theory of sense perception by means of his theory of rational intuition. He is first a mystic and then a philosopher. He first knows God in his immediate consciousness, and then justifies it by showing that we can know objects in no other way. His God-consciousness is thus the presupposition of his world-consciousness. In this lies his distinction from the sober Realism of Scotland, which rises inductively from the realities of sense, to the objects of reason and faith. With Jacobi there is no such subordination of faculties, or if there be a subordination, it is one in which the positions are re-

versed, and sense gives place to reason. But the position advanced in this paper may be considered to favor the denial of this distinction between the German and the Scottish schools, and to reduce Jacobi to an ordinary psychologist. Such is not its meaning. It is a question of the real *worth* of the rational intuition, which is raised in the statement under consideration. Jacobi's *feeling* or *belief* is to be analyzed into its only possible meaning when stripped of the flowers of his rhetoric, and this we find to be only that which is ordinarily understood by the terms—a faculty of appropriation or assent, exercised on materials given by another faculty. This is the only meaning which it is possible to ascribe to any theory of intuitive knowledge of the Absolute, and in Jacobi's case, though he claims to possess a faculty by which the supersensible is *given* directly, we can find no definite explanation of its action.

Moreover, it is a product of his later thought, and not the original form in which he presented his doctrine. The influence which we have found to be fundamental in his early life, that of religion, is opposed to the theory of reason or faith as the source of direct and independent knowledge of God. By this, reference is not made to the opposition which the church has always offered to reason as a source of truth, for Jacobi was never influenced by church doctrine as such. For him, all religions were true so far as mystical, and Christianity is included in this conception, though as the highest of the class. What is here meant is that mysticism itself is opposed to the conception of a direct knowledge of the Absolute. And this for the reason that it is opposed to *all* knowledge. The highest state of the mystic is that ecstasy in which consciousness is lost in the union with God. This state is reached, it is said, through the continued contemplation of the divine vision—the eye of the soul is turned inward till sight is lost in the dazzling splendours of its

object. There seems here a direct claim to a sight, or knowledge, of God and supersensible things, but it is not so.

The true mystic brings back no accounts of the glories he has seen. Those descriptions which he gives relate only to the first stages of his approach, and are but accounts of the sensations of this life and world—not of the glories of the unseen. The true mystic is quiescent—he is content to rest in the immediate certainty of his personal experience, without entering upon a defense of it before the world. Sensation, feeling, is the mystic's ideal. In this he is content to rest passively. He has no need of words to describe his contact with the Absolute, nor are they adequate—no *thought* could express his *feeling*.

This is the position from which Jacobi starts—this God consciousness. No one can deny that this *is* his starting point. Herein lies his distinction from the Scotch thinkers. The problem, however, is as to the results obtained through this consciousness. Is it a *source* of *ideas*, parallel with the senses? In spite of Jacobi's later assertions, we must deny it this character, and appeal to his earlier statements as more correct expressions of his views. In all his earlier writings he had made no such distinction as that which he emphasizes in his final philosophy, and which was given him by Kant. In the fifteenth letter of *Allwill's Briefsammlung*, a passage which Jacobi indicates as the clearest expression of his doctrine of absolute objectivity, there is no hint of any source of ideas save sense. What we find is a faculty of belief, testifying to the existence of a reality which finds expression in the appearances of the senses. The ground for such a belief is not that we *perceive* this reality, but that our instincts force us to suppose its existence. Though we are but dreams to all appearance, yet a being which is *only* dream, is an *Unding*. There must be meaning behind this changing play of sense, and sometime we shall

see it as "Anschauung des Wahren aus einem grösseren Zusammenhange neu hervorgehen, und den Grund des Missverständes uns erkennen lassen, der uns so unsäglich geneigt machte, in das Buch der Natur einen besseren Sinn immer nur hinein radieren zu wollen."¹ Faith is here "the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen." The "given" element on which Jacobi lays such stress after he has taken his lesson from Kant, is the *belief* in supersensible reality, not the object of that belief. It is trust in that whole tone of mind which has ever been to him the one thing precious in life.

We can see the nature of this belief in another light, if we consider the twofold character of Jacobi's early studies. Plato and the English empiricists are most often quoted in his early writings. The nature of his Ideas he derives from the former, the belief by which they are held, from the latter. Plato was troubled by no such epistemological dualism as was the source of Jacobi's difficulty. His ideas, though the ultimate realities, were not inaccessible to human knowledge—there was no such gulf fixed between thought and being as we find in modern philosophy. Hence this supersensible was only the extension of the sensible, not different in kind, but in proportion and degree. The sensible *partook* of these realities, instead of hiding them from us. This thought Jacobi wished to retain. It is Plato's Ideas the reality of which he will establish. But for him there is no bridge from thought to reality. The ideas are in the individual mind—how shall their independence be shown? Here comes in Hume to his aid. The only difference between an idea which is thought, and one which is, or represents, existence, is a peculiar feeling accompanying the latter and rendering it more vivid. This feeling is *belief*, and is our only guarantee of existence. Here we

¹ I., 135.

have Jacobi's watchword, *Glaube*. He expressly recognizes the similarity between the position of the skeptic and his own.¹ The difference lies in the fact that one rejects the evidence, while the other accepts it. The acceptance is made by the *Glaubenskraft*, which is first later to develop into the *Vernunft*. As yet, the facts to be accepted are all furnished by the cognitive power in general—there is no sharp division of the faculties. By the exercise of all his powers man attains to truth, and this truth is evidenced by the immediate certainty we have of it.

After Kant had analyzed knowledge into the formal and material elements, Jacobi feels the need of revising his language, though retaining his beliefs. Accordingly we find his system modelled after Kant's. There is the *Sinn*, *Verstand*, and *Vernunft*. The point at which he separates from Kant is in regard to the nature of the *Vernunft*. Kant had asserted that the Ideas of reason, having no corresponding perception, were empty, and could serve only as guiding principles of knowledge. Jacobi makes the *Vernunft* this lacking perceptive power through which the Ideas receive reality. We have thus the two corresponding receptive faculties, united and thought by the *Verstand*. But yet the office of the *Vernunft* is not restricted to this narrow sphere, however clearly its limits are marked. The old meaning of *Glaubenskraft* still clings to it in its new dress, for we find Jacobi making it guarantee the truth of *Wahrnehmung*. He had been asserting that the only way to meet Kant was to maintain the reality of perception, that we know not only phenomena but also an objective reality *in* phenomena. Against such a subjectivity we have only the "positiv offenbarende, unbedingt entscheidende Vernunft, oder den natürlichen Vernunftglauben."² The function of this faculty is thus not to furnish new content of thought, but to pass judg-

¹ II., 156.

² II., 36.

ment on that already furnished. It is a selective faculty, which determines instinctively the true, beautiful, and good.¹ In this it is similar to Kant's conscience—an internal tribunal in man which determines the worth of our ideas and actions. The Ideas, which are merely guiding principles for the understanding, receive, not a new *content*, but a *ratification* through the practical reason. It is on the moral side that we have to seek the value of the reason—its function is in pronouncing judgments of worth. It does not decide the absolute form which objectivity must have, but determines the relative value of our partial conceptions of it. No idea we can form will give us truth, but some ideas are more valuable to us than others. This is the thought Jacobi brings out in the appendix to *Allwill's Briefsammlung*—the letter to Erhard O * * *. This was written in 1791, and is presented by Jacobi as one of the important expressions of his thought. In it, he admits that we are encompassed by shadow and dream, that we know not even the being of our existence. "Alles prägen wir mit unserm Bilde, und dies Bild ist eine wechselnde Gestalt; jenes Ich, das wir unser Selbst nennen, eine zweideutige Geburt aus Allem und aus Nichts: die eigene Seele nur Erscheinung. Doch eine der Wesenheit sich nähernde Erscheinung! Selbstthätigkeit und Leben offenbaren sich in ihr unmittelbar."² This being we thus partially know in ourselves, we assign to all existence, and claim that it is more natural than a mere mechanical explanation.³ It does not exhaust existence, yet the ultimate reality cannot be *less* than personal—it is our highest category.

It is impossible, then, to regard this later terminology which Jacobi employs, as a fortunate change. It merely obscures the real purpose of his work, by confusing the world of values with the world of explanation. He is really seeking satisfaction for his moral and religious needs, and to this end

¹ II., 20.² I., 231.³ I., 251.

must be assured of the existence of a reality which meets these needs. He must know that they are not mere subjective dreams, of which he must be healed in order to know the truth. For this purpose he can find no other means than a belief in their objective validity. They are their own warrant by virtue of the intense and irresistible power with which they appear in consciousness. The soul is forced to recognize them as meeting its deepest needs, though it can find no proof of their validity external to themselves. *Glaube* is thus the faith in the soul's power to appropriate that which has absolute value. It has nothing to do with the means by which the objects are given, nor with their inter-relation and mechanical form. It is their relation to the self and their meaning in its life, that is the object of the *Vernunft*. In giving it the function of supplying material for this judgment of value, Jacobi distinctly weakens his position while rendering it apparently more coherent. It is an unnecessary duplication of functions which introduces confusion into all the system. The *Vernunft* is given the office of perceiving a special kind of Ideas, and also of testifying to the value of *all* the concepts of consciousness. Jacobi himself, while insisting strongly on this new use of the term, has always the older meaning in his mind.

We return thus to our starting point. Jacobi's immediateness is one of certainty, and not of origin. His denial of thought is his refusal to accept a system which would seem to separate him from immediate contact with reality. He is unwilling to have his deepest feelings transformed into concepts—his values displaced by descriptions. There is a blind, unconscious emotion at the root of his life, which defies attempt at explanation and mediation. This idea, or mood of mind, is the result of his mysticism. It is his misfortune that he fails to recognize the fact that mediation may yet be consistent with immediateness, and that the

truth of his immediate certainty need not be impugned by the analysis of its contents. Yet this distinction he never clearly sees, but thinks it necessary for the maintenance of his position, that those ideas which are for him simple, should be considered representative of objective truth. Any attempt to understand these simple elements of knowledge is considered a dangerous concession to Idealism. It gives an opening to that tendency to demonstrate which necessarily leads to atheism.

5. Conclusion

To gather up the elements of Jacobi's thought and present them in a consistent whole, is a difficult, if not impossible task. To point to any one result of his work as that by which he has deserved well of humanity, is almost as difficult. We might point to the material results as exhibited in the formation of a school of thinkers taking his principle of *Glaube* as their starting point, but the influence of that school does not seem to depend on that principle, and hence can hardly serve as a distinct memorial of our author. In truth his thought was little adapted to be the centre of a philosophic school. He recognizes this in a letter to one of his disciples, Johann Neeb, "To be a teacher, in the proper sense of that term, I am not fitted: I can only offer myself so that others may learn, not from me, but *out of* me and through me, according to the measure of their need and ability." It is his own personal *Weltansicht* which he offers, and any attempt to make it the shibboleth of a school could only result in distorting its true meaning by generalizing that which was in its nature particular. His personal followers, Köppen, Neeb, Ancillon, have nothing to offer but the repetition of the cry, *Glaube*. Their names are scarcely

¹ *Briefe*, II., 433.

heard in the history of philosophy by the side of the great representatives of the idealistic systems. Of far greater value, though not so directly exercised, was the influence which Jacobi exercised over a group of men whose only bond in common was their debt to him and Kant. These men were Fries, Schleiermacher and Beneke. However diverse their systems are in their completion, they all contain this element borrowed from Jacobi—the importance of immediate feeling. And yet perhaps it were a more correct statement to say that Jacobi's writings were the means by which their already latent thought was brought to expression, for it is a significant fact that Fries and Schleiermacher grew up in the same environment which was the source of Jacobi's doctrine—their parents were members of the *Brüdergemeinde*. They too, as Jacobi, early outgrew the particular pietistic doctrines of the sect, but there can be no doubt that this early cultivation of the emotional element in their nature made them ready to embrace such a doctrine of Glaube as Jacobi offered. In Fries, it took a prominent part in his metaphysical theory, by supplying an immediate intuition as the source of the Kantian forms of thought. The Kritik is thus made a psychological examination of the *a priori* elements of consciousness. These elements are necessary to knowledge, but the discovery of them in the mind is not also an *a priori* process, but the result of an empirical examination. Beneke contains the same line of thought, making psychology the basis of metaphysics. The starting point must be a fact of consciousness, whose truth we can only feel or believe. Unlike Jacobi, however, he finds the only immediate knowledge of reality through the inner sense. We are conscious of ourselves in the unity of our manifold powers. Of other beings we only know the phenomena, and so far as we consider them existing objects, we read into them our knowledge of ourselves. Schleier-

macher's relation to Jacobi is different from that of these other two. It is not in his metaphysics that he shows the influence of this Realism, but in a special sphere of the soul's activity. His theory of knowledge is derived from Kant. In thought, we can never close the gap between being and thought. The latter is never adequate to the former. But in feeling, we are conscious of this unity. This is the sphere of religion in which the reconciliation of the contradictions in knowledge can take place. We can here feel ourselves one with the ultimate Reality, though we can never raise this feeling into clear thought. The opposition between *Glauben* and *Wissen* is absolute. Here we recognize Jacobi's influence, and it is expressly noticed by Schleiermacher in the dedication of his *Reden*, which is the earliest and most decided expression of this mood. In later life, especially through the influence of ethical considerations, this individualism is somewhat modified. But if Jacobi had no other monument, the influence exercised by him through Schleiermacher over the religious life of Germany, would be sufficient.

Yet it is not even in these special developments of his thought, that the main results of his life are to be sought. To none of them could he give his full assent, nor do any of them represent final results in the history of philosophy. It is rather in the impulse which he gave to the study of psychology, that we must recognize his lasting worth. Nor is this such a vague statement as it may seem at first glance. It is true that he shares with Kant the merit of destroying the rational dogmatism of the 18th century, and that his name is quite overshadowed by that of his great contemporary, but it is also true that the development initiated by Kant took a direction which was wholly opposed to psychology and resulted in dogmatisms as rational as those destroyed. It is Jacobi's merit to have recalled philosophy to the study

of the inner life. By insisting on the value of primary beliefs as the ultimate criteria of truth, he makes necessary the minute study of these facts, and the consequent analysis of consciousness. This, the great service of Empiricism in general, was rendered to German philosophy by Jacobi. Nor is he merely notable as the instrument by which this was accomplished. He is more than a mere representative of a general tendency. It has been of great value to German psychology that the founder of this movement was such a clear and critical observer as he was. The "relationless impression" of Locke and the French psychologists, was not the starting point of the German development. Beginning later, it had learned the lesson of English Empiricism, and starts with a truer account of experience. That Jacobi's service is not recognized so widely as it deserves, is probably due to the fact that his writing is so unsystematic, and also that he himself does not consider his service to be of this kind. His influence is indirect and unintended, but none the less valuable. In his own eyes, he is not a psychologist, but a philosopher. In fact as fact, in science as the organization of phenomenal knowledge, he has no interest. His psychology has for him a value only as it serves his religious needs—its function is largely negative, as showing the impotence of rational knowledge. Herein we find his weakness. He will have the fact of consciousness an ultimate. Psychology must be metaphysics, and not psychology in its broadest sense, but the most simple and irrational deliverance of consciousness. He disparages explanation in favor of existence. Whatever seems to destroy the validity of a single fact, must be rejected. Without explaining, we must believe. This is the alpha and omega of his system. If we will have those beliefs which have been dearest to mankind in all ages, we must accept them through *Glauben*, not *Wissen*. The last words of his philosophy are, "One thing we know full well,

that Providence and Freedom, if they were not in the beginning, can be nowhere else. Hence man is deceived by his spirit, his heart, and his conscience, which give him these ideas as most true. A fable, a lie, were then man; a fable, a lie, were man's God—the God of Socrates and Plato, the Christian's God. This was my earliest word: I end as I began."

VITA

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